Elusive Unity

by Julian Velez

Unity between the different groups is a key aspect for the outcome of these negotiations, because that is how strong positions on the decisions come about and also that is how agreements come forward. If each country only pushed for their agenda and their agenda only, nothing would happen. Countries work as blocks to find united positions that give strength to their statements. The political influence of block positions becomes a force that can shift things in negotiations. This is particularly important for poor countries because otherwise their small voices wouldn’t be heard in this concert of giants.

Right now the developing economies are not finding a united voice. There is division and they are starting to have conflicts between each others’ positions when their interests are shared within their climatic and economic reality. Developing countries are the ones that are most affected by climate change. They are minor emitters in relation to the developed countries which not only have much higher per capita emissions, but also have a long history of emissions that has brought us to this crucial moment with the world’s environment.

The role of the African countries is crucial for the direction that these negotiations will take. They are being pressured to be divided. The Africa Group is trying to have a united vision for the outcome of Durban; we will see what happens when the ministers and the heads of state come in. These official figures don’t deal with details of the text – they deal with big political deals that are country-driven. They also have interests that are for personal political campaigns. The problem is that some countries have sold out in backdoor financial deals with threats and offers. When this happens, the country blocks can’t make statements as a whole.

The main issue is that the developed countries are pushing for a commitment that will relieve them from more responsibilities rather than giving them the responsibility to fulfill obligations that they had already signed to.  Developed countries are pushing for a deal that will create a good image for them and the Durban COP, while not really holding them to hard obligations. They want to show that they worked hard for a tangible result.

Right now it seems that most developing countries agree with the terms for the outcomes of these conference. Except for AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States), which doesn’t have a unified position, even publicly.  For example they all want an ambitious, legally binding second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. The question in this conference is not whether we have a second commitment period or not – we will have one – the discussion is on how that decision is made. The question is: when it starts operating, how ambitious will it be in terms of emissions reductions, when do certain major emitter parties come into the protocol, and under what conditions they will join the commitment. In a general sense developed countries want to have less pressure for their commitments and developing countries want stronger commitments for developed ones at all levels.

Yesterday the High Level Segment of the convention started; these negotiations are carried forward by ministers and heads of state. Now it all depends on how strong developing countries stand with their block position and whether or not they sell out their position, and with it, the united voice of their group. Another factor is how much developed countries use development aid as a manipulative tool to push their own agendas. It is in this high level segment that all the big deals and bribes happen.

The Great Escape

Or “How they help us help ourselves lose the fight”

by Anjali Appadurai

Is the climate regime unraveling before our eyes in Durban?

There are some scary indications that it is. Some Parties are “cautiously optimistic” (India), some are “reasonably optimistic” (Brazil) and some believe that this is all going down the drain (a different Indian negotiator). The truth is, expectations are all over the place at this particular COP. So much hangs in the balance – the future of the Kyoto Protocol, the establishment of a Green Climate Fund, the launching of a new Technology Mechanism, a new Adaptation Committee , the founding principles of the Convention itself – and negotiators have so much at stake that they could really go either way on these issues.

The biggest topic on the table at the moment is the question of the “Durban Mandate”, a phantom whose two-faced visage hangs over the negotiations, gaining strength by the day. Like Samuli wrote,  there are several shapes this Mandate could take. The idea I’ll deal with in this post is that developed countries would sign an entirely new treaty under the LCA, leaving the Kyoto Protocol behind and starting afresh, while developing countries would take on their own commitments as per their abilities. The US has expressed that in order for them to sign this treaty, it would have to include all “major emitters” – namely India and China. India has all but blocked this prospect, eliciting backlash from various groups (more on that later).

What are the problems with such a new treaty? Well, there are several. First off, as AOSIS, Africa Group and BASIC emphasize – we already have a treaty. The Bali Action Plan is a COP decision, which under the UNFCCC is legally-binding in the fullest sense of the word. The BAP, intended to supplement the KP,  seemed to be a fair deal – Annex 1 (developed countries) would continue with the KP and reduce emissions by 40%, the US would do something comparable but not as binding under the LCA (this is called ‘shared vision’) and developing countries would act according to their abilities. Ditching the Bali Action Plan in favour of something new would simply be a way for A1 countries to be let off the hook while appearing to be committed to emission reduction action. The key here is that any new treaty would be based upon a “pledge and review” (PAR) system, which removes binding obligations based upon historical responsibility (one of the foundational principles of the Convention). Is it worth it to abandon our existing frameworks (BAP, KP)? Does it not send the message that we have failed in what we set out to do? There are four developed-country scenarios for the PAR system – they range from “low-end pledges with loopholes” (the worst) to “high-end pledges without loopholes” (the best). Under the first scenario, pledges could be as low as -6% emissions reductions. That’s an increase in emissions by 6%! Even if developed countries didn’t use the loopholes and kept to their pledges, it would still be very difficult to achieve global peaking of GHG emissions by 2015, which is what we want. The PAR system could work in some type of world in which countries understood the scope and urgency of the problem, but in this world, the pledges are too low, the action too weak, and the system ineffective.

The Durban Mandate – the way it’s being talked about – is a great escape. It opens the back door for A1 countries to run away from their commitments completely, while still maintaining face.

On a parallel track – the future of the Kyoto Protocol is the future of the mitigation regime as a whole. This is inextricably linked to the issue of the Durban Mandate. The second commitment period of the KP is not negotiable – when countries signed onto the KP back in ’97, it was directly implied that they would continue their commitments through a second commitment period. Furthermore, in the original negotiations about the KP second commitment period, all countries agreed to adopt the IPCC science-based reports that called for 25-40% reductions as an aggregate target.

A misconception was spread prior to this conference that the KP “expires” in 2012. Terms like “post-Kyoto” have been floating around in various places, subtly shaping expectations for the outcome in Durban. There was talk (and still is) of a “political second commitment period”, which would comprise a period of time resembling a commitment period during which PAR would be the basis for emissions reductions. At this point in the negotiations, it would be embarrassing for A1 countries to abandon the Protocol altogether (although Canada, Japan and Russia don’t seem to mind). It looks like they’ll put it on life support for a little while – a way to showcase its haggard face as a success of Durban: Look! We kept the KP alive! We are the heroes of the climate regime.

The form this takes is the “EU roadmap”: take on a second commitment period, but with huge conditions. Involve the “major emitters”. We’ll talk about further steps in 2015 or 2020 when it’s too late.

This shaping of expectations, then grand unveiling of a roadmap that seems great but is really the biggest sellout of the conference is particularly harmful because it affects the perception of civil society as well. NGOs have started to support the EU roadmap and call for BASIC countries (who are for the most part opposed to it, especially India) to support it. In a press briefing with India just a few days ago, several different members of civil society (from environmental groups or the press) asked the same question in an accusatory tone: why won’t India comply with the EU’s “legally-binding treaty”? India’s reply was consistent: perhaps we haven’t made ourselves clear enough, but we are not major emitters – we are an enormous country with a very small per-capita carbon footprint, and to put us at the same level as A1 countries is to undermine the very principles of the Convention and to shift the focus of obligation to developing countries.

And right they are.

To push forward the idea that the purpose of Durban is to create a new treaty is a grand sellout. It’s a great escape because the strategy employed is that of “divide and conquer”, wherein countries sell out one by one like dominoes, upending any consolidated effort from groups such as the G77.

It’s a great escape because cleverly disguised policies convince our “own” people to help us lose the fight. Misinformation, lopsided media attention and subtle messaging get across ideas that are harmful to the support we should be giving – as civil society – to constructive, responsible, ambitious policies. I’m sure we are victims of the same game in many ways. I know that my understanding of these issues is not whole or complete or as well-informed as I’d like it to be. But as civil society we must make it our imperative to acknowledge that and strive to support the fairest, most ambitious actions being taken at the UNFCCC today.

Post-2012 Climate Regime: How Much Worse Can it Get?

[actually quite a lot]

by Trudi Zundel

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will end in 2012. In anticipation of that ending, Parties have been discussing what form the new UNFCCC commitments will take. The first item on the table: will there be a second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol?

Developed and developing countries have fundamentally different hopes for a Durban outcome. Developed countries are using this as an opportunity to drop out of a legally-binding protocol that they don’t support. In their opinion the KP is outdated, based on 1990 measures of “developed” and “developing” countries. China, Brazil, and India are considered developing countries under the UNFCCC, which means that their emissions are not legally restricted. Developed countries are saying that, based on total amounts emitted, these three countries are among the world’s highest emitters, and any protocol that doesn’t restrict them is useless. According to the USA, this is the reason that they refuse to sign onto the KP; really, though, for most developed countries, they don’t want to restrict their economy if their major economic competitors don’t have to.

The media has only been reporting that countries are working towards a treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, and ignoring the developing country goal of continuing commitments under the Kyoto Protocol with a complementary treaty alongside. This lack of coverage is a problem because it lowers public expectations about a second commitment period.

At COP13 in Bali, Parties agreed on the Bali Roadmap, which established a two-track system: one was a working group on the Kyoto Protocol, whose job was to improve and update the Protocol. The second was a working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA), spearheaded by the USA, whose task was to create an alternate mechanism to the Kyoto Protocol based on a shared vision among all UNFCCC parties. Now that the first commitment period of the Protocol is coming to an end, the future of these two tracks is uncertain: some of the most important negotiations here in Durban will be about the legal form of the LCA.

The legal form is very important. A new, legally-binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol would take a long time to develop and implement—during the lag-time, if the Kyoto Protocol did not continue, there would be no legal restrictions on emissions. A legally-binding treaty that would only complement the Kyoto Protocol, which is what some developing countries want, is also dangerous—legally, the most recent treaty takes precedence over earlier ones. If the new treaty is not as effective as Kyoto, it will still take legal precedence.

A new, non-legally binding treaty to replace Kyoto, which is what the US wants, would be based on a pledge-and-review system. This means that countries would commit to reduce however much they feel they can, and would not have a legal mechanism to make sure that they do even that.

The choice between a new treaty to replace Kyoto and one to complement it is a false dichotomy. Negotiators seem to be forgetting that any COP decision, like the one that came out of Cancun, is in fact legally-binding because countries are party to the UNFCCC, which is a legally-binding convention.  COP decisions do not need as much time to implement, because domestic governments do not need to ratify it. A COP decision to complement the Kyoto Protocol might be the best option for developing countries, especially given the urgency of climate change.

Politics of the New Treaty: What’s Likely to Happen?

On this issue, opinions can be reduced to a few main camps. Developed countries like Canada, Japan and Russia, spearheaded by the USA, want a non-legally binding mechanism that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. They would prefer a “pledge and review” system, in which countries determine for themselves how much they are able to reduce emissions.

The US has rigid demands for the LCA, and will not negotiate its stance under any circumstances. It wants a non-punitive pledge and review system; “symmetrical” legal obligations for developed and developing countries; and developing country pledges that are not conditional on finance.  This outcome would be disastrous for the climate—current pledges from countries under the KP would result in a global temperature rise of 5°C; without legal obligations they might fall further.

Canada has just formally announced at the COP that it is pulling out of the KP, although it has been saying this all year; Japan and Russia, too, will most likely not sign on.

The EU, who champions the “ethical developed country” cause, has said that it is open to a second commitment period, but only if other major economies (like the US, Canada, and Japan) commit, too. It will commit to a second period, however, only if there is an agreement to develop a new treaty to replace Kyoto after the second commitment period.

Developing countries are wholeheartedly in favour of a second commitment period,  but would like to see a new treaty that complements the Kyoto Protocol— it would bind the US and allow space for long-term finance, while keeping developed country commitments under the Protocol.

Neither of the opposing camps is willing to negotiate, and there is no point in having a new agreement or treaty that only  a few parties will sign onto. According to a presentation by the Third World Network yesterday, there are three possible Durban outcomes:

  1. The best deal ever!: Developing countries get everything they want—developed parties commit to a second commitment period of KP, there is a new treaty or decision alongside it that the US agrees to sign onto, in which it and other developed countries agree to longer-term finance. Emissions pledges under the second commitment period of the Protocol will limit global warming to 2°C, maybe even 1.5°.
  2. A bad deal: no second commitment period for major developed countries; a new legally-binding treaty to be developed— one that takes several years to develop, and locks in bad practices. Nothing is done for developing countries or the environment, but the multi-lateral negotiating process is saved! Any new regime will not be as strict as the Kyoto Protocol, because no developed countries would willingly sign onto something that asks more of them than the KP already does.
  3. The worst deal: Parties are at a standstill in negotiations, are not able to agree, and no deal is reached in Durban.

I understand the importance of optimism for activism. We can’t know what’s possible unless we try, etc, etc. However, I also think that it is both interesting and important to look at the best possible option within the political context. The first option above, which many NGOs and civil society groups are fighting for, is highly improbable (but I do hope that it happens). Most country positions are decided long before Durban—on issues as big as legal form, their positions are inflexible, and it’s too late now to change that. Those battles must be fought on the domestic level, long before COP rolls around. The second outcome is all too close for comfort. A new treaty would be negative progress—the proposals by the US (who holds the most power in the creation of the new regime, remember) allows developed countries to continue polluting while receiving credit for mitigation, and ignores their historical responsibility to help developing countries adapt.

Realistically, our best hope now is to do everything it takes to stop that regime change from being agreed. As Bolivia asserted in Cancun last year,  no deal is better than a bad deal. This is especially true when a legally-binding regime is on the line. We can’t let the urgency of climate change lead us to be roped into a “solution” that will make things worse than they already are.

Canada’s Idea of a Christmas Present: Backing Out of the Kyoto Protocol

~Graham Reeder

Recent information from CTV (a Canadian news agency) is showing that Canada is planning to formally back out of the Kyoto Protocol. Canada, along with Japan and Russia have been saying for a year that they do not want to make any new commitments to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) after this year, but backing out altogether places Canada in the same position as the US. This is part of a greater strategy from countries in the developed world to undermine the Kyoto Protocol, the only legally binding international document that ensures greenhouse gas reductions on behalf of both developed and developing countries.

The argument that these developed countries are touting is that the Kyoto commitments are only applicable for developed countries that are party to the KP, meaning that they do not include major emitters like China, India, and the US, and that a new treaty is needed that includes both developed and developing countries symmetrically. The truth is that emissions haven’t happened symmetrically: the developed countries that are bound by the Kyoto Protocol and the US are responsible for the vast majority of greenhouse gasses currently in the atmosphere as well as all of the current climate change being experienced. To expect countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa to pay for the mistakes of rich countries is a direct contradiction of the principles laid out in the UNFCCC and dooms us to a bottom up approach that effectively locks us into a 2-5 degrees C warmer world.

This latest development is a new low even for Canada. Canadian delegates have routinely blocked progress and lowered ambitions on all fronts at the UNFCCC, beating the US for Fossil of the Year Awards by Climate Action International for four years running, but pulling out of a legally binding protocol at such a crucial point is perhaps the biggest insult to the UN and to the rest of the world any Canadian government has committed. Canada regularly rides on its reputation of being an environmental leader, an international peacekeeper, and an all-round reasonably minded country, a reputation built for the most part by the Liberal Party of Canada in the late 20th century. The Conservatives have taken power in the last 10 years and have steadily undone almost everything that earned Canada that reputation over the past century; this could be the final blow. It is high time for Stephen Harper’s conservatives to step aside at the international level, they have shown that they are unwilling and unable to negotiate in good faith and should run back home before they embarrass Canadian citizens any further.