All posts tagged kyoto

Posted:
December 6, 2011
Author:
COA Students

Who Are These Guys Anyway?

by Joe Perullo

I decided to do some investigating on who exactly the country delegates were.  Who hires them? Who are they really representing? What do they do outside of the UNFCCC? When we say the US is stalling progress and shoving responsibility onto developing countries, who exactly do we mean?  A lot of fingers are pointed at the delegates, but they’re just people, right?

The US was my case study, but I’m sure the basic structure (not to be confused with political agenda) can be applied to most countries.

As we know, the countries’ positions are determined long before the negotiations take place by foreign ministers.  In the US, this responsibility is given to the State Department, a department under the Executive branch (so the president has the ultimate authority). The delegates we see negotiating at COP are usually workers of the state department or people hired by it. Within the State Department, policies pertaining to the COP are done by the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES).  This is where they lay out exactly what they want the text to look like coming out of a COP. Now, I’m sure they really do care about the environment, but keep in mind that any standpoints they want the delegates to make at COP need to get approval by the greater Department of State—who’s agenda isn’t confined to making international peace or saving the planet but to bettering the lives of Americans—and be signed by the Secretary of State, who is nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

The State Department’s official agenda is, as officially mentioned in the Foreign Policy Agenda, “to create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.” In reality consideration of the international community is far from the top of the list.  The “american exceptionalism” of the country and its governments will not allow members of the house, who also need to think about re-elections, pass a bill that would let the country fall behind China in the green economy. And lets not forget about corporate lobbyist. Even if the OES and the delegates want nothing more than for the US to reduce emissions, they are at the whims of the State Department.

This is exactly what happened with the Kyoto Protocol—the US signed on to it but it could not be ratified through congress.  That signing was a clear “mistake” on behalf of the US COP delegates who negotiated such a protocol out, since it did not accurately reflect the actual will of the US to have legally binding emission reduction targets.  With this system, the delegates in some way “weren’t” doing their job.  I wouldn’t be surprised if they were released or given undesirable positions as punishment.

This gives American political environmentalists a tough choice: do they focus their energy in the international realm, where they can more tangibly deal with policies that affect the world, or in their own country, in an attempt to influence the internal struggles that determine when the true gavel is smashed in international negotiations?

Posted:
December 5, 2011
Author:
COA Students

China Syndrome

by Nathan Thanki

With the dirty details of week one out of the way, COP17 is changing gears into the high-level segment. Heads of State are coming to town, security is ramped up (execpt at our hostel) and the drone of talks about an outcome  becomes louder and more persistent. A lot off that buzz is around a Durban deal, the so called “Durban Mandate.” Most of the noise is around whether or not the BASIC countries – Brazil, South Africa, India, and China – will sign up to a deal that legally obliges them (and perhaps many other developing countries other than LDCs) to reduce their emissions. The questions that journalists and some major NGOs are fumbling around with are “will China sign in order to secure further commitments from annex-1 Parties?” and “what will it take for them to do that?”

China, as the world’s largest overall emitter, is sensing that the onslaught is about to start. With the wounds of the global backlash from Copenhagen (where China took a media crucifixion for not signing up to a ‘suicide pact’ ) still fresh, Chinese authorities decided that this weekend was the perfect time to set the record straight on what their official position is. I was lucky enough to gain access to the China pavilion Sunday morning to hear the Chinese negotiator Xie Zhenhua  field some questions.

The general buzz yielded the expected questions such as: what are China’s expectations in general, on the Kyoto Protocol, does China support a legal outcome from the Bali Action Plan (BAP), and what are the conditions for China signing up to the mandate?

Xie sat by himself, unaided by staff or papers, and answered in depth on each point. Regarding expectations, China is quite clear that as the first commitment period of Kyoto (KP-1) comes to a well publicised end here, we must move on to the second (KP-2). As Africa group have pointed out as well in their press brief today, the fact that annex-1 Parties ratified the KP implies they will sign on to KP-2. A KP-2 must be an outcome: it’s the only legal treaty, and it uses the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, and equity. Everyone keeps saying we cannot bury KP at Durban, and they’re right. We’d have to bury the entire regime too. The transition between the two commitment periods has to be seamless: there can’t be a gap where developed countries can pollute all they want.

The idea of China signing up to emissions reductions (in an obligatory way–they already have ambitious reductions in their 5 year plan) is contingent on the results of KP. China is also calling for a simultaneous review of the implementation of KP-1. How well did the developed countries do in meeting their promises (it’s not a trick question – the answer is the obvious: terribly!) and what does that then imply for KP-2, and long term cooperative action? As China see it, the issue of KP-2 is an issue of testing political trust. How can they trust the developed countries to actually reduce emissions in a non-legal treaty, given that they failed to do it even in a legal one. More to the point maybe, how can they trust that the USA (who notoriously pulled out of KP) will ratify the new mandate?

A deal is expected, yes, but not a perfect one.  Rather, China expects a deal that can be signed and can be implemented.

Annex-1 countries like to point out that developing countries now account for over half the world’s emissions, and that they therefore must be included in new legal arrangements to reduce emissions. But under the Convention, developing counties have commitments – 1bii. And so far, it is developing countries who are showing they have committed to comparable reductions. Annex-1 countries have not shown the same honour.

However, even given that, China recognises that it must curb emissions. So the willingness is there – it’s a matter of the details (which is more than can be said of the US). China have indicated that the new legal outcome should be from the LCA, as mandated by BAP. They also have some conditions. One, the aforementioned review of KP-1. Two, a KP-2 that is separate and not contingent on a new mandate (as opposed to EU’s proposal). Three, progress in institutionalizing mechanisms under the areas of finance, tech transfer, adaptation, and capacity building. These ‘conditions’ are not new or unfounded, but based on 20 years negotiating.

The USA is trying to maintain its hegemonic power, so it must do all it can to trip up and smother it’s rivals. Stuck in a competitive rather than cooperative worldview, the States are playing a risky game with our planet’s atmosphere for the sake of trade flows and bragging rights. However, the recent developments in regard to China’s willingness to play ball could make things difficult for it’s neighbour and BASIC (sort-of) ally: India. With a similarly sized population–and large overall emissions–India looks set to come under fire from the media and governments of the developed world. One can already imagine the India bashing headlines of the tabloids. Are they ready?

Posted:
December 3, 2011
Author:
COA Students

Possible outcomes from Durban

by Samuli Sinisalo

After one week of negotiations, what are some of the possible outcomes we can expect from Durban?

The negotiations run on the two tracks: Kyoto Protocol and the Long term Cooperative Action.

From the Kyoto track, there are at least four possible outcomes:
1) No second commitment period is signed and Kyoto Protocol is buried and forgotten
2) Negotiations for second commitment period are extended by another year
3) The Kyoto Protocol is continued selectively with a political declaration
4) The Kyoto Protocol gets a second commitment period

From the Long Term Cooperative Action track I can think of at least five possible outcomes:
1) No agreement – the Bali Action Plan is buried and forgotten
2) The Bali Action Plan is concluded with a political declaration of emission reductions
3) The Bali Action Plan is not concluded, but extended for another year
4) The Bali Action Plan is rewritten into a new Durban negotiation mandate
5) The Bali Action plan is concluded by signing a new and ambitious legally binding instrument

The options above are listed in order apparent success. Number ones are the clear failures, which are hard to be spinned into successes by anyone.

Number two on both lists are the political declarations. This would be simply repeating the failure of Copenhagen. The political approach of pledge and review has been out there for two years now, and it can be seen that it is not the solution to the mitigation of climate change, nor to the adaptation. Especially under Kyoto Protocol it would be better to continue negotiations than to lock into low level of ambition and compromise the legally binding status of the Protocol.

Option 3 on KP track and options 3 and 4 on the LCA track all result in the continuation of negotiations. As I said, for KP it’s better to continue negotiating that to settle for a bad outcome. Under LCA, the negotiation mandate from Bali has already been extended twice. As long as real progress is made, extending it for another year might not be a bad idea. But renegotiating the negotiation mandate, turning the ambitious, comprehensive and equitable Bali Action Plan into a watered down Durban Mandate is not a good idea. The planet and the developing world only have things to lose if the Bali Action Plan is redefined.

The optimum outcome, the only real and unquestionable success from Durban would be the signing of the second commitment period under KP, and the non-KP Annex 1 Parties committing to comparable cuts under the LCA.

Whatever the combination of these two negotiating tracks is, we will see in about a week. The media, all over the world, is likely to call it a success. With this breakdown of the negotiations, you can analyze yourself what kind of success it really was. Unfortunately the negotiations are likely to go for the lowest common denominator and result in the least ambitious combination possible that can be spinned as success in the eyes of media and public. For the time being, Durban Disaster seems to be the most likely outcome from COP17.

Posted:
December 2, 2011
Author:
COA Students

Julian’s Intervention


Yesterday Julian Velez, representing the youth, had the great opportunity to give an intervention during the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP), the main negotiating body that works under the Kyoto Protocol. The ability for civil society to give interventions is one of the only official avenues within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to express positions on specific topics. Although valuable, these two-minute interventions are still a very small window. At the very least, these interventions are a space for youth to push lines, express ideas that can challenge and give a voice to under-addressed issues.

The text was drafted by a small team of youth and then approved by the larger youth constituency.

__________

My name is Julian and I am a youth delegate from Mexico representing the Youth constituency.

Despite the commendable decision to suspend CDM coal projects, the youth  constituency has significant concerns in regards to the design and implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).

While the CDM has been presented as an opportunity to facilitate technology transfer, there is a significant economic bias towards rapidly emerging economies and minimal engagement with least developed countries.

We also share similar concerns to a number of governmental and non-governmental bodies, including the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change, in relation to the problematic framework of carbon markets.

Furthermore, we are seriously concerned about the potential for CDM projects to  contribute to Human Rights abuses. To date, CDM projects have resulted in forced relocation, loss of land and multiple violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

For example, in July 2011, the Aguan biogas project was registered despite evidence that the project developer was connected to violent land conflicts. Last month, the Agros CDM reforestation project also prompted a request to the U.N. Secretary General that the project be deregistered and banned from receiving carbon credits, as it was using illegally-seized land.

Despite evidence of human rights abuses in both cases, the CDM Executive Board has argued that it has no mandate to address the issue of human rights and that the responsibility lies with the host country.

Additionally, the Conference of the Parties has recognized the importance of human
rights in all climate change related actions, including the selection and review of projects.

The mandate of the CDM Executive Board must therefore be re-assessed and redefined to give force to the provisions of the UN Charter and other rules governing UN bodies.

Regardless of the outcomes of the negotiations of the Kyoto-Protocol, the CDM, or any reiteration of it, must correct its technology bias, address widespread concerns of its market approach, and safeguard the protection and rights of affected communities.

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