Ministers begin their work

 by Samuli Sinisalo

The ministerial Indaba-consultations about the Durban outcome begin tonight. In front of them, the ministers have five options for the possible outcome. No decision is not amongst them at this level.

The first option is to implement a new legal instrument under article 17 of the convention. This would mean that the contents of the new instrument can be anything – made up in Durban.

Option two is to complete an agreed outcome based on the Bali Action Plan. Then the outcome would build on what that LCA track has negotiated since 2007. It would address Shared Vision, Adaptation, Mitigation, Technology Transfer and Finance.

Third option is to conclude the aforementioned BAP pillars through a series of decisions. This takes into account work done in Cancun and Durban. Fourth option is to implement BAP and the Cancun Agreements.

Option five is to complete the BAP and Cancun agreements through a series of decisions and begin a process to develop post-2020 arrangements/legally binding instruments. These negotiations could either take place in the LCA group, or within a new subsidiary body. Suggestions for timeline vary from 2012 to 2017.

Any of the above mentioned options can be described as a partial success – at least on the surface. What is common to all of them is the lack of ambition. That much seems granted at the moment. Only numbers on the table at the moment are those pledged in Copenhagen and cemented in Cancun. They put the world on a 4-6 degrees Celsius pathway.

Fortunately the EU proposed text today under the KP track that would enable countries to increase their ambition level in future. Similar designs have worked under the Montreal Protocol. But the climate negotiations are currently suffering from lack of political will for more ambitious emission reductions, and a mechanism by itself is not going to change that, or save the planet. It has to be used as well.

Further, the briefing paper for the ministerial Indaba mentions that the common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities might be dynamic. The responsibilities specified for developed and developing countries might be redefined and renegotiated. Up to now, developed countries emissions reductions actions have been conditional on financial support from the developed world.

Friday night will tell what the final package is. It seems that things are in motion in Durban, and something will come out. Whether it is a real solution, or an empty shell is yet to see. There are positive signals for a potential outcome, but the risk of getting empty declarations instead of real solutions is still looming. Total failure is not likely, but neither is complete success.

Options for the Outcome

by Samuli Sinisalo

The last 48 hours of Durban are at hand. Decisions are going to be made, one way or another.

On the future mandate, the LCA working group on legal options for the outcome, came up with a conference room paper yesterday. That paper specified four options for the LCA outcome from Durban. And as we well know, most Kyoto proposals are conditional on what comes out from the LCA.

Option 1 on the paper is: a new protocol to the Convention, pursuant to Bali Action Plan and the Cancun Agreements. Negotiations would be started in 2012, and completed by COP 18 or latest COP 21. The protocol would include mitigation for all parties as targets and/or actions, with MRV and market mechanisms. The protocol also covers adaptation, technology transfer and finance. LCA working group would be extended until the completion of the new protocol.

Option 1bis requests the LCA to complete through a legally binding instrument/outcome. My interpretation of this is, that it is very similar to option 1, but the outcome would not be called a protocol.

Option 2 requests the LCA track to complete through a series of decisions, pursuant to Bali Action Plan and the Cancun Agreements.

Option 3 requests the LCA to continue negotiations.

Option 4 is no decision.

This is more or less where the negotiators finished their work. The issues are not forwarded on to the ministerial level. From here on decisions and progress cannot be technical, but political decisions need to be made.

The Common African Position

by Samuli Sinisalo

By the end of the week, we will know what Durban will deliver. Durban is an African COP, and Africa will have a key role in determining the outcome. A united Africa is a strong force in the negotiations, as the rest of the developing world is likely not to challenge them. What is good for Africa, is good for the developing world.

In September the African Ministerial conference convened in Bamako, and issued a declaration with the key messages for the Durban negotiations. This three page document is really significant – if Africa stays true to it and pushes the goals together.

First, the Bamako declaration highlights the Millennium Development Goals, and how climate change puts further challenges on achieving them. They have not been extensively discussed in the UNFCCC in the past, but they might be in the future. Second, Africa wants the UNFCCC to maintain its status as the forum where climate decisions, based on science, are taken. The declaration also includes the principles of historic responsibility and common but differentiated responsibilities.

More specifically, the African ministers declared they want two separate outcomes from the negotiation tracks. On Kyoto Protocol, the wanted an amendment to Kyoto Protocol for a legally binding second commitment period from 2013 to 2017, with ambitious targets that keep the Annex 1 countries on track for 40% cuts by 2020 and 95% by 2050. In the second commitment period, market mechanisms could only count for 10% of the national emission reductions – rest would have to be domestic action. On the LCA track, the non-Kyoto Annex 1 Parties should take on comparable emission reduction objectives.

Further the Ministers wish to operationalize the Cancun institutions on adaptation, technology transfer and finance – all under the supervision of the COP. The Green Climate Fund should additionally have its own legal personality. On finance, they were concerned the private sector and about the division of funds between adaptation and mitigation. Adaptation needs are increasing by the minute, but private funds steer away, as relocating coastal communities is not as profitable as generating renewable electricity. The concern about fast start finance already seems futile, as the developed countries pledges are already falling short and there is no remedy in sight.

Last, but not least, I want to highlight the part of the Bamako Declaration which calls for maintaining a firewall between the developed countries legally binding mitigation commitments and developing countries nationally appropriate mitigation actions. The latter are conditional on financial support from the developed world. This has been the cornerstone of the UNFCCC for nearly two decades, but is now challenged in Durban as even some developing countries, including China, are ready to negotiate on this.

Some of the African countries are expected to diverge from the common position in the name of short term national gains. The last days will show whether Africa stands united until the end. Will they crumble? What will they compromise?

Russia Presented a Possible Deal Braker

by Samuli Sinisalo

On wednesday, the COP plenary discussed Russias proposal to amend the UN Framework Convention on Climate change.

In the convention countries are divided into different cathegories – and have different responsibilities – according to their development status. These annexes are Annex 1, which includes all the developed countries. have legally binding emission reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol.

There is also another annex, called the Annex 2. That is a group of countries who, in addition to the responsibilities laid out for all Annex 1 countries, have the responsibility to provide financial assisstance to the developing countries, or non-Annex 1 countries. In practice Annex 2 includes all the A1 countries, except the Eastern European economies in transition.

The developing countries are known non-Annex 1 countries. They have no legally binding emission reduction commitments under the Convention, or the the Kyoto Protocol. Their primary concern is development and poverty eradication – not cutting emissions.

The problem is that this division was created twenty years ago, in 1991. Since then a lot has happened – many countries that were underdeveloped two decades ago are now seen as the global economic engines, notably the BASIC countries, Brazil, South-Africa, India and China.

Especially the United States has had problems to accept emission reduction targets, while the BASICs have no obligations to reduce their emissions as they are non-Annex 1 countries.

On wednesday afternoon the the COP plenary discussed Russias proposal to add a mechanism to the convention that would enable this division from 1991 to be reviewed by the COP periodically. This idea received wide support from the COP, only Saudi-Arabia spoke against it saying that the historic responsibility that the developed countries have on climate change has not changed since 1991.

The President of COP 17 will take this proposal forward and take it to consultations. If designed carefully, this could help open the deadlock that climate negotiations have been in for several years.