All posts by COA Students

Posted:
December 8, 2011
Author:
COA Students

“Not just a fund-a JUST climate fund”

by Nathan Thanki

Before we get the official say on what the green climate fund should look like, let’s just remind ourselves what a really just GCF would look like. As one member of the YOUNGO finance working group said today “we don’t want just another climate fund, we want a just climate fund.” So what is a just climate fund?

First and foremost, a just fund must be a transparent fund that caters to the needs of the beneficiaries–developing countries. To this end, the GCF must be accountable to the COP and not the GCF Board, or the SBI. The Board will have a 50-50 split between developing and developed countries, which does not reflect the numbers within the UNFCCC and indeed the world. Basically, the developing countries should be able to decide how they spend the climate finance, rather than have those decisions dictated by the developed countries.

The GCF has to have a distinct legal personality so that it may enter into contracts and not rely on the personality of it’s trustee, at the moment the World Bank. The role of trustee must be clearly limited to simply holding funds for donors and giving it out as instructed by the board. At no time should the Trustee apply its own policies when disbursing funds. Developing countries rightly have a problem with the World Bank acting as Trustee given their previous experiences of structural readjustments resulting from debt on development aid and loans. They are worried that the same thing could happen with climate aid.

The Fund should be filled, as an empty piggy bank is still an empty piggy bank, no matter how well designed it is. The developed countries have to make sure the GCF can be up and running quickly – and this means paying for the set up to make sure the fund is ‘operational’ ASAP. Public funds (government money) should be used, not private investment. The private sector has no obligations under the Convention. There is no guarantee that the private sector investment won’t dry up. If we look at he Adaptation Fund we can see the danger of market based approaches. When the price of carbon went down, the Fund ran dry. Saying that, it is a recession after all, so perhaps we need innovation in funding? A financial transaction tax could generate enough money to fill the fund. These possibilities need to be explored and then specified in governments pledges and deliveries of finance.

Once the fund has been filled we can get to the business of spending. A just GCF would specify that at least 50% of funds go to adaptation projects. Adaptation is not a profitable business, it is a life saving business. It will not generate profits, and therefore the money given to these projects must be in the form of grants. Loans for adaptation are going to lead to unsustainable debt for developing countries. The problem is that if loans are offered, they will take them, because the need for adaptation is so great. There should be transparency in the spending process, definitely. The money needs to go to the most vulnerable, not the pockets of some corrupt manager or politician. But transparency does not equal donor countries being able to dictate to the recipient country on how they should spend the money. That is their decision: and who knows the needs of the poor more than the poor? Designated national agencies should be chosen by the recipient country, not the donor. Such restrictions are not just. Similarly, a results based approach is unfair. Adaptation projects do not yield very tangible, measurable results. Besides, money must come first, and then results. A lack of ‘results’ should not be used to block funding for adaptation projects.

And finally, what is a just fund if not a fund that is open to people? Civil society needs to be able to apply directly to the fund: we need a dedicated civil society window. The GCF Board has 2 civil society seats: we need more. It’s our money, after all. The TC report has made note of several constituencies; such as indigenous people. This is a step toward a just fund, but a truly just fund cannot ignore the youth constituency. We are more than half of the world, and it is us who will bear the full brunt of climate change. Some of us will pay with our homes and with our lives, it is totally unjust to not even recognise us as a stakeholder. It is our future that (isn’t) being funded.

Justice is not particularly forthcoming within the UNFCCC, we know this from bitter experience. And a just climate fund is 20 years overdue, so the likelihood of Durban delivering on that front is slim. That is not to say we won’t be told there is a great, shiny, new Fund; just like we’ll be told there is a wonderful new regime to save the planet. It is important to recognise progress when it has been made, but it is more important to be sure that it is for the right thing. An empty GCF in exchange for a Durban Mandate is not just stupid, it is suicidal. A just climate fund and a just climate regime based on principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and historical responsibility are demands that we must keep reiterating, till our voices are hoarse and the sun has set on Durban.

 

Posted:
December 8, 2011
Author:
COA Students

What happened to the hope of a green climate fund?

by Nathan Thanki

In our pre-COP speculations, everyone thought that the GCF would be one of the key issues and (possibly) outcomes of Durban. The promise–of a new, large, additional, transparent fund that would be driven by the countries that received the money and guaranteed adaptation funding–was great, a light at the end of the dark tunnel through which parts of the regime, like the continuation of Kyoto, might not make it. When the TC report came up on the COP plenary agenda, ears all over the ICC picked up. And yet since then there has been a resounding silence. So what’s been happening?

Many countries expressed dissatisfaction with elements of the TC report on the design of the GCF. Developing countries had many concerns–that this would become just another climate fund–and developed countries were concerned that the fund might actually be too recipient-driven and COP controlled. However, most countries thought it was better to have a compromised design than no fund at all. AOSIS practically begged Parties in the COP plenary to leave the text. Previously the US and Saudi Arabia had blocked consensus of the report as it was forwarded to the COP. But in the plenary, new voices of dissent emerge. ALBA–through Venezuela–began insisting they could not accept the text as it stood. Then COP president Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, reading from a script, declared the obvious: Parties have diverging views on the fund. She proposed that those with the biggest concerns get together and talk it over in an informal over which she would personally oversee. And just like that, the GCF disappeared from our radar.

Where it’s at now is somewhat unclear. Even after the US and ALBA looked certain to open the text, it appears that the COP presidency has kept it closed. Instead, Parties have been working in a very closed group, termed “Indabas”; a gathering,  or council of elders. We are essentially playing a waiting game to see what they come up with by the end of the week. The biggest concern right now is that some new text emerges out of the air that doesn’t reflect all Parties concerns. That’s some step down from the promise that the GCF was going into last week.

There are rumours around the halls of the ICC now that a deal has been struck. Saudi Arabia, the US, ALBA and Egypt have all been reportedly blocking progress by sticking to their positions. It seems now that something has given: but it is more likely that the sacrifices were in terms of an overall package. In other words, we will have a more or less structurally sound (apart from the concerns over a private sector facility) but empty Fund. In exchange for that, what did developing countries give up? We’ll know by tomorrow night for sure, but it can’t be good.

Posted:
December 8, 2011
Author:
COA Students

Hold your breath and read this

or “Technology Transfer to date in the negotiations”

by Anjali Appadurai

One of the more concrete outcomes from Cancun last year was the establishment of a new “Technology Mechanism“. This cross-cutting mechanism was intended to be the place where the entire technology transfer cycle across the Convention could be managed. The Tech Mechanism consists of two parts: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN). These two bodies are meant to work together to facilitate north-south and south-south flows of clean technology to help countries meet their emissions reduction targets.

The TEC is the policy arm of the Tech Mechanism; it guides the direction and strategy for technology development and transfer under the Convention. Made up of 20 executive members elected by the COP, the TEC is supposed to have equal representation from the global North and South.

The CTCN is a bit of a nebulous concept. It stands for Climate Technology Center and Network, yet to date no one really knows (Parties included) whether the Center and the Network will be two separate bodies or one integrated thing. Since the chair and vice chair of the TEC were decided in Panama (after lengthy discussions on whether a developed or developing nation official should have been the first Chair and vice-Chair, even though the positions rotate annually), the CTCN was the focus of half the discussions on tech transfer. It was handled under the subsidiary bodies (SBI/SBSTA).

Since the juicy stuff – IPRs and trade measures – were taken off the COP agenda and moved to informal meetings, us mere Observer parties were left with the dry bones of “host of the CTCN” and “modalities and procedures of the TEC” as topics to follow in negotiations. In case you’re already bored, I’ll try to make it as readable as possible.

Under the subsidiary bodies (the SBI and SBSTA), the talk centered around choosing the host for the CTCN. Discussions – both open and informal – laboured on for days before one of the co-chairs finally pointed out that there was no definition of “host” neither was there any definition of whether the CTCN would consist of a center, a network, or a combination of the two. This only made negotiations even more convoluted, and no decision was reached. There is, however, a detailed document elaborating how Parties may go about proposing a host, as well as an exhaustive list of criteria for this undefined host figure. The decision on this will probably be made sometime in early-mid 2012, but for now, I heard some juicy rumours floating around (some people in the YOUNGO working group on tech transfer are really good at sneaking up on negotiators and eavesdropping on their conversations).

First, a bit of background: India brought up a controversial proposition in one of the CTCN meetings. They called for increased financial support of the CTCN from the Global Environment Facility. The GEF, keep in mind, is a partner (and puppet) of the World Bank. Channeling funds from them into the CTCN would immediately give the WB influence over the CTCN’s activities – so this was already a contentious suggestion. A delegate from the Philippines later explained to me that India did this (and was supported by several other developing countries) as a way to get at least a bit of funding for the CTCN. The alternative would be the private sector initiatives pushed forward by the US (which, by the way, did get mentioned in the final decision because the US pushed so hard for them).

The first piece of gossip in the tech transfer hallways is that the GEF is putting in a bid to be the host of the CTCN. This would be a disaster for the future of tech transfer. The Technology Mechanism was created as a new mechanism last year, and the hope is that it will be fully operationalized by next year – there is great hope in this new beginning, and great potential for good things to be done to improve the flow and quality of technology to countries that need it. Instead, if the GEF ends up as the host, there would be a permanent WB presence in the tech transfer cycle.

Another rumour is that an Indian non-profit organization called The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), headed by Dr.R.K. Pachauri (also the head of the IPCC, which is the scientific body responsible for providing the “official” climate science to governments), is planning to put in a bid for host-ship. TERI aims to create “an environment that is enabling, dynamic and inspiring for the development of solutions to global problems in the fields of energy, environment and current patterns of development, which are largely unsustainable” (check out http://www.teriin.org). Now what a change in tune from the GEF! Moreover, TERI is based in India, which would place the CTCN leadership in the global South, where technology transfer should rightfully be based!

So there’s an update on the status of the Technology Mechanism. The latest (from today) is that the shortlist of hosts ranked in order of preference will be compiled by next August, and the host decided upon at COP18. Then maybe this Mechanism can finally get off the ground. So stay tuned!

Posted:
December 8, 2011
Author:
COA Students

Take it, leave it or change it…

by Julian Velez

The ALBA group (Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas) sees that Transitional Committee (TC) has expressed very serious concerns regarding   the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The TC was uncharged of drafting all the details of how the GCF is going to function and the TC report was brought up for either adopting or rejecting it. The ALBA group doesn´t want to reject the report but they see that it has many parts that needs amendments. The TC and the GCF are one of the achievements of the Cancun Agreements. The GCF is a fund that is supposed to finance projects on adapting to climate change and mitigating Co2 emissions in developing countries.

They have various concerns on this subject. The fund as it is right now will provide funding based on the results of the projects, so that developing countries would have to finance the projects without having certainty on a refund. This system is kind of backwards because the whole purpose of the fund is to help developing countries that don’t have the resources to pay for the projects… they are putting the horse before the cart.

One of the proposals for the way the fund may be structured would be like that of a private entity: without assembly, in the form of a board.  It would also transfer funds to private entities directly without passing through governments or public institutions. ALBA is in favor of a board, with balanced representation from developed and developing nations, so that decisions are not taken solely by the providers of the money.

Another point that ALBA is concerned about is the fact that the World Bank is the current trustee of the fund, and if this is accepted the World Bank would have too much influence in where the funding goes.

ALBA would rather have nothing than a fund with many flaws. They want to leave Durban with a well structured fund.

They are also very strong about engaging with civil society to exchange perspectives both to enrich their positions and inform civil society about what is going on in the negotiations.

The dialog provided by ALBA was very valuable because it gave a perspective from the only unified Latin American block. They were very open and direct with civil society and willing to talk and answer questions. This forum is very valuable because it is very hard to find this kind of openness that includes civil society.

 

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