Against the grain: who’s fighting the Carbon Markets?

by Joe Perullo

The Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting to the Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, also known as the CMP, began today with the issue of the Clean Development Mechansim (CDM).  Martin Hession, the Chair of the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB), opened the discussion with a report of improvements made to the CDM.  These included improved verifications of proposed projects and words like “[improved] efficiency” and “effectiveness.” It all sounded vague and unreliable, but nothing more substantive could have been hoped for for when the country delegates took the floor.

Most country delegates praised the CDM EB.  Many of them began their speeches recognizing the hard work and progress the CDM EB has made.  These opinions came from both developed and developing countries.  There is no surprise that developed country members were in complete approval of the CDM, since it is the most economic way they can meet their commitments.  As for developing country members, there are two strategies I see for their approvals of the CDM. Although many CDM projects have empirically had harmful long term effects in developing countries, it is clear that many developing countries see the CDM as the only way to encourage financial investment from the global north. Another reason is that developing countries may recognize that the CDM is one of the only things keeping many developed country parties committed to the Kyoto Protocol.

Venezuela was one of the few countries who harshly criticized the CDM.  Its statement was short but included the underrated fact that offsets have led to increased carbon emissions.  No other member addressed this issue.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was in favor of the CDM provided that there would be a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

The discussion on the CDM winded down with a member of the World Bank.  Her statements were very optimistic in regards to the CDM’s future. Specifically, the World Bank hoped to see improved access to the CDM to developed countries and finds the CDM to be an important bridge to new market mechanisms.

Most of the opposition to carbon markets seems to come from third parties such as civil society. A speech given by the youth, in particular by our very own Julian Velez, was extremely counter to what was said by most parties.

The interests and world views that I’ve seen define the carbon markets are appearing more and more complex to me.  Yesterday I got a chance to ask Hession if he would be willing to let me interview him.  He agreed, but I have yet to hear back from him…

The Tragedy of the Least Developed Countries

by Graham Reeder and Nathan Thanki

While there are more controversial and contentious issues regarding financing for adaptation (the report on the GCF today in COP plenary, or the report from the Adaptation Fund Board to CMP plenary), there are some interesting discussions going on elsewhere.

For example, in yesterday’s continued opening plenary of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Uganda stirred things up with a vivacious and biting criticism of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)(read World Bank) and it’s role in funding adaptation to climate change. They started by pointing out how the failure of current National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) is entirely due to the slow and inadequate financing of the GEF. When Uganda developed their NAPA plan in 2007 to deal with urgent adaptation needs, they were expecting the project to be funded and implemented as was mandated by the UNFCCC. A year later they got their project back saying that they needed to change their implementing agency because their chosen partner (UNEP) was incapable of handling a project of that size. Who the GEF would have preferred instead is unclear. Unfortunately for the GEF, Uganda does it’s homework, and decided to conduct some follow up research. Speaking with permission of Gambia on behalf of the LDC group, Uganda pointed out that UNEP has implemented even larger programmes than theirs, and therefore has both the relevant capacity and experience. Uganda maintained in no uncertain terms that the GEF had no right to dictate such terms. The NAPAs are supposed to be country driven, and are not another excuse for the World Bank to get their fingers into the development plans of the Least Developed Countries. Following up today, the LDC group went on to complain that the GEF, through its Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF), has only funded NAPAs even though there are many other activities that need urgent attention under the LDC work programme.

As countries move into the next phase of adaptation to climate change, parties like Uganda and Bangladesh want to make sure that things actually get moving; they are sick of being asked to put their own resources into developing plans that don’t get funded or implemented. Uganda gracefully pointed out that the principal of urgent and immediate needs which the NAPAs are meant to address aren’t so relevant when they finally get implemented 80 years down the road. Urgent needs are urgent needs after all. But the lack of urgency in helping LDCs respond to climate change is, in their own words, “disappointing and depressing.” The question of the Ugandan delegate highlights: what is the point of having a fund (LDCF) if access to that fund was difficult bordering on impossible? In a break away contact group on finance under SBI, Colombia made similar points about a lack of understanding that climate change is happening right now, and its impacts are being felt RIGHT NOW. She added that of all the projects the LDCF had assisted with transfer of technologies, only 2 had been for adaptation.

On top of the dire state of adaptation funding there are the severe problems that the developing world has with the GEF as the financial mechanism. There are problems with transparency around how much money is in the funds, where it is from, where it goes, who asked for it and so on. There are even more problems with transparency around the decision making process. And while the SBI and COP can make recommendations to the GEF, it is not enough. There are too many problems, too many bad experiences, and too much bad blood. It is clear why a new fund (the GCF) with a guaranteed 50% window for adaptation and answerable to the COP is so desireable.

The Ugandan intervention was definitely one of the more lively and honest that we’ve seen in this COP, but as the rich of the world continuously refuse to commit to emissions reductions while at the same time stall and backtrack on promises of adequate, additional, scaled-up and predictable funding, we can expect more of the same. It’s the same old refrain: time is running out. For some it already has.

worried about the next COP already…

-Nathan Thanki

It was just announced in the AWG-LCA (Ad-hoc working group for long-term cooperative action) that COP18 is going to be in…wait for it…Qatar!

What are the chances of the Emir, Hamad Bin Khalifa al Than, allowing for any loud and large civil society presence?

What are the chances that a Qatari COP-Presidency keeps the process open to all?

What hopes could we have (and, of course, much depends on how bad things could get here) of ever coming to a global emissions reduction agreement that is in line with the science to keep us below 2 degree warming?

Practical considerations and personal egos/relationships really do have a big impact on negotiations, policy, and therefore but for now, thoughts back to the talks here in Durban…

follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/earthinbrackets from now on for shorter updates likes this!

Post-2012 Climate Regime: How Much Worse Can it Get?

[actually quite a lot]

by Trudi Zundel

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will end in 2012. In anticipation of that ending, Parties have been discussing what form the new UNFCCC commitments will take. The first item on the table: will there be a second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol?

Developed and developing countries have fundamentally different hopes for a Durban outcome. Developed countries are using this as an opportunity to drop out of a legally-binding protocol that they don’t support. In their opinion the KP is outdated, based on 1990 measures of “developed” and “developing” countries. China, Brazil, and India are considered developing countries under the UNFCCC, which means that their emissions are not legally restricted. Developed countries are saying that, based on total amounts emitted, these three countries are among the world’s highest emitters, and any protocol that doesn’t restrict them is useless. According to the USA, this is the reason that they refuse to sign onto the KP; really, though, for most developed countries, they don’t want to restrict their economy if their major economic competitors don’t have to.

The media has only been reporting that countries are working towards a treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, and ignoring the developing country goal of continuing commitments under the Kyoto Protocol with a complementary treaty alongside. This lack of coverage is a problem because it lowers public expectations about a second commitment period.

At COP13 in Bali, Parties agreed on the Bali Roadmap, which established a two-track system: one was a working group on the Kyoto Protocol, whose job was to improve and update the Protocol. The second was a working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA), spearheaded by the USA, whose task was to create an alternate mechanism to the Kyoto Protocol based on a shared vision among all UNFCCC parties. Now that the first commitment period of the Protocol is coming to an end, the future of these two tracks is uncertain: some of the most important negotiations here in Durban will be about the legal form of the LCA.

The legal form is very important. A new, legally-binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol would take a long time to develop and implement—during the lag-time, if the Kyoto Protocol did not continue, there would be no legal restrictions on emissions. A legally-binding treaty that would only complement the Kyoto Protocol, which is what some developing countries want, is also dangerous—legally, the most recent treaty takes precedence over earlier ones. If the new treaty is not as effective as Kyoto, it will still take legal precedence.

A new, non-legally binding treaty to replace Kyoto, which is what the US wants, would be based on a pledge-and-review system. This means that countries would commit to reduce however much they feel they can, and would not have a legal mechanism to make sure that they do even that.

The choice between a new treaty to replace Kyoto and one to complement it is a false dichotomy. Negotiators seem to be forgetting that any COP decision, like the one that came out of Cancun, is in fact legally-binding because countries are party to the UNFCCC, which is a legally-binding convention.  COP decisions do not need as much time to implement, because domestic governments do not need to ratify it. A COP decision to complement the Kyoto Protocol might be the best option for developing countries, especially given the urgency of climate change.

Politics of the New Treaty: What’s Likely to Happen?

On this issue, opinions can be reduced to a few main camps. Developed countries like Canada, Japan and Russia, spearheaded by the USA, want a non-legally binding mechanism that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. They would prefer a “pledge and review” system, in which countries determine for themselves how much they are able to reduce emissions.

The US has rigid demands for the LCA, and will not negotiate its stance under any circumstances. It wants a non-punitive pledge and review system; “symmetrical” legal obligations for developed and developing countries; and developing country pledges that are not conditional on finance.  This outcome would be disastrous for the climate—current pledges from countries under the KP would result in a global temperature rise of 5°C; without legal obligations they might fall further.

Canada has just formally announced at the COP that it is pulling out of the KP, although it has been saying this all year; Japan and Russia, too, will most likely not sign on.

The EU, who champions the “ethical developed country” cause, has said that it is open to a second commitment period, but only if other major economies (like the US, Canada, and Japan) commit, too. It will commit to a second period, however, only if there is an agreement to develop a new treaty to replace Kyoto after the second commitment period.

Developing countries are wholeheartedly in favour of a second commitment period,  but would like to see a new treaty that complements the Kyoto Protocol— it would bind the US and allow space for long-term finance, while keeping developed country commitments under the Protocol.

Neither of the opposing camps is willing to negotiate, and there is no point in having a new agreement or treaty that only  a few parties will sign onto. According to a presentation by the Third World Network yesterday, there are three possible Durban outcomes:

  1. The best deal ever!: Developing countries get everything they want—developed parties commit to a second commitment period of KP, there is a new treaty or decision alongside it that the US agrees to sign onto, in which it and other developed countries agree to longer-term finance. Emissions pledges under the second commitment period of the Protocol will limit global warming to 2°C, maybe even 1.5°.
  2. A bad deal: no second commitment period for major developed countries; a new legally-binding treaty to be developed— one that takes several years to develop, and locks in bad practices. Nothing is done for developing countries or the environment, but the multi-lateral negotiating process is saved! Any new regime will not be as strict as the Kyoto Protocol, because no developed countries would willingly sign onto something that asks more of them than the KP already does.
  3. The worst deal: Parties are at a standstill in negotiations, are not able to agree, and no deal is reached in Durban.

I understand the importance of optimism for activism. We can’t know what’s possible unless we try, etc, etc. However, I also think that it is both interesting and important to look at the best possible option within the political context. The first option above, which many NGOs and civil society groups are fighting for, is highly improbable (but I do hope that it happens). Most country positions are decided long before Durban—on issues as big as legal form, their positions are inflexible, and it’s too late now to change that. Those battles must be fought on the domestic level, long before COP rolls around. The second outcome is all too close for comfort. A new treaty would be negative progress—the proposals by the US (who holds the most power in the creation of the new regime, remember) allows developed countries to continue polluting while receiving credit for mitigation, and ignores their historical responsibility to help developing countries adapt.

Realistically, our best hope now is to do everything it takes to stop that regime change from being agreed. As Bolivia asserted in Cancun last year,  no deal is better than a bad deal. This is especially true when a legally-binding regime is on the line. We can’t let the urgency of climate change lead us to be roped into a “solution” that will make things worse than they already are.