A New Adaptation Framework: Don’t hold your breath for this empty shell

by Graham Reeder

This past week (and year), I’ve been following the issue of adaptation. As many of you know, Climate Change is not just a long-term threat that is looming in the horizon; it is being experienced by people now in a very real way.  The World Health Organisation estimates that climatic changes are causing 150,000 deaths annually; the vast majority of which are in sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the major, but unpublicised outcomes of Cancun was the groundwork for a new adaptation framework. The Bali Action Plan from 2007 laid out a track for mitigation and adaptation to be considered equally, but this has obviously not been the case. Laying out the Cancun Adaptation Framework is basically the first real step in doing anything sincere about adaptation under the convention. Having said this, the first step has truly been a baby step.

Negotiators have been working out how to incorporate the existing elements of adaptation under the convention, namely the Nairobi Work Programme that sets out to research how adaptation to climate change works and where the vulnerability lies, to fit into the new framework. It looks like the overarching body to oversee adaptation is to be the Adaptation Committee, a group of negotiators who will be responsible for creating coherence among adaptation activities and holding workshops. The composition of that committee is still being worked out; parties disagree about whether emphasis should be on the countries who will be doing the adaptation (developing), or the countries who will be financing that adaptation (developed, but not really). Under the Committee, there will be three branches, the first will be the Nairobi Work Programme, viewed as the scientific and technical arm of adaptation that will mostly do research, the second will be a work programme on Loss and Damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, and the third will be the formation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). All of this will be nicely tied together by the Adaptation Fund, which will work with the Green Climate Fund and other partners to finance all of this bustling activity. But wait; don’t get too excited about all of this action yet, remember that the GCF isn’t operationalized, and probably won’t be for a while, and even if the Adaptation Fund gets operationalized, it remains nearly empty. Rich countries aren’t happy that they don’t have more say over where and how the money in the Adaptation Fund gets spent, so they stubbornly don’t fill it despite their obligation to do so.

But enough about finance, there will be plenty more on that from my colleagues who follow it more closely. There have been some very interesting arguments between parties about the 3 elements of the adaptation framework, work is still being done in back rooms about the adaptation committee, but the chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (Robert-Owen Jones from Australia) is adamant that negotiations should be as transparent as possible and has kept his meetings on adaptation open to observers.

The group of negotiators who work on adaptation (the adaptation community, as they call themselves) are pretty much the same on all issues. A handful of strong negotiators from the US, Australia, the EU, Norway, Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, the Cook Islands, and Timor Leste dominate most of the talking space. COA’s very own Juan Pablo Hoffmaister (07), one of the founders of Earth In Brackets, is the lead negotiator for the G77+China (a group of 131 developing countries) on issues of adaptation and works tirelessly to coordinate the group and keep it strong. The adaptation community is forwarding several decisions to the COP on the three components of the framework. They have developed a more solid plan for the work programme on loss and damage, after negotiating serious compromise between AOSIS (the Alliance of Small Island States) and the US/Australia on the issue of creating a mechanism to actually do something about it. The US doesn’t think they’re ready to commit to doing anything about loss and damage, saying that they need another year to learn about what it really means and how to deal with it before deciding on anything, while AOSIS is saying that they don’t need another year of sitting around a conference table twiddling their thumbs, they are suffering in terms of millions of dollars and many lives and need the issue to start being addressed as soon as possible. They have ultimately reached a compromise in which the possibility of a mechanism is mentioned, but there is no commitment to actually creating one.

On National Adaptation Plans, the fight has been a little bit more nuanced. Initial division was between developed and developing countries over involvement of the Global Environment Facility as an interim financer until the Green Climate Fund is created, developed countries wanted the GEF to have nothing to do with NAPs because the last round of adaptation programmes (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) that were focused on urgent and immediate adaptation needs were supposed to be implemented by the GEF and still haven’t been 3 years later. Developing countries also wanted to be clear that NAPs couldn’t just be a planning process, but needed to have an implementation component. The Least Developed Countries are sick of seeing money go towards plans that don’t get follow-through. The latest fight is within the G77 itself though, Least Developed Countries (a group of mostly African countries that also includes parties like Bangladesh and Afghanistan) and “particularly vulnerable countries,” a broader group that also includes some Latin American countries are disagreeing about including mentions of particularly vulnerable countries in the text. The LDC group have always been privileged in adaptation text because their capacity to deal with adaptation themselves is the lowest, but that doesn’t mean that they’re the only ones who are vulnerable. This is where finance becomes important, this fight wouldn’t be happening if there was enough money in the pot to go around, but countries are scrambling over the scraps that rich countries have made available. Because of this, the G77 isn’t united on NAPs, making it a lot harder for them to negotiate strongly on the issue. This is most assuredly part of an EU and US (particularly the UK) tactic to divide and conquer the G77.

On the Nairobi Work Programme, most of the fight has been figuring out how to bring it under the Cancun Adaptation Framework. Because it is the only piece of this puzzle that predates the framework, parties are squabbling over how it should fit into the picture. While most developing country parties want to see them report to the Adaptation Committee and start a new phase that is focused on more applicable adaptation needs, developed country parties are happy with the way things have been going and like that it has mostly produced a bunch of academia on adaptation that can’t be applied in very many contexts. After some tough negotiations, negotiators have agreed to start a new phase (the Durban Phase) of the work programme that will have a few of the elements that developing countries wanted, but still won’t be focused on implementation.

Overall I’ve gotten the impression that adaptation negotiations have been going well, they’ve made progress on issues and have (for the most part) worked in the spirit of compromise. That being said, there is absolutely no way that the work that is being produced by the adaptation community reflects the urgency and needs of climate change adaptation on the ground. In my SBI intervention yesterday I tried to stress that youth and other particularly vulnerable groups really don’t have time to sit around and wait for them to squabble over the placement of commas and that what practitioners already know about adaptation needs to be both implemented and funded.

Graham’s Intervention to the SBI:

Yesterday, Graham Reeder gave an intervention during a plenary of the Subsidiary Body for implementation.  Earth in Brackets plans to post videos of Graham’s and Julian’s interventions, so look out.

 

Thank you chair,
My name is Graham and I am here with College of the Atlantic to speak on behalf of the youth
constituency.

We appreciate the work we have seen to ensure solid outcomes and progress on key issues, but the
ambition on the part of developed countries has not been high enough and has not reflected the amount
of work that all parties have contributed in the last week. Here are some key areas of concern for youth:

———————

On finance, we call for better transparency within the GEF to make information and decisions relating to
amounts and flows of funds easily available. We want fewer obstacles to access of funding in order to
meet the urgent needs of developing countries, Least Developed Countries in particular.

The GEF must address the adaptation gap. We are concerned to see that 3.3 billion dollars have been
given to mitigation projects, and a mere 370 million for adaptation! We cannot wait for the green climate
fund: adaptation needs funding now. We call for an increase of activities under Article 6; the GEF must
ensure funding goes to systematic observations in developing countries,

——————–

We call for fair, equitable, and balanced solutions for the following three topics so that the Technology
Mechanism can become fully operationalized by no later than next year.

Funding for the CTCN must come from an equitable and transparent source with adequate safeguards in
place. Technology Needs Assessments must be accompanied by adequate training and support for
countries that will receive them. And equal attention must be paid to mitigation and adaptation within the
pilot projects under the Poznan strategic programme.
———————-
You have finished the review of Capacity Building but your work is not over. Negotiations so far have not
reflected the fun, passion, motivation and transformative power of Capacity Building that we feel every
day.
Young people are experts on Capacity Building and want to be recognised for our work. We ask that you
explicitly mention youth as experts and practitioners and include stakeholder inputs in reports and reviews.
——————–
Parties have done good work on adaptation. We urge you to accept the AOSIS proposal for language
changes on an international mechanism, the research is there, and youth do not have time to wait for
developed countries to be vague and slow on this matter. We wish to stress that NAPs cannot afford to
suffer from the same dismal implementation strategies as the NAPA process that LDCs are still waiting to
see on the ground, that strong guidance from the Adaptation Committee will be crucial to the success of
NAPs, and that adequate and accessible interim financing will be key as we wait for the development of
the GCF.

——————

We thank the chair for his hard work; he clearly understands the urgency of these issues and noted that
his own parents had lost their home in last year’s floods in Queensland. We urge those developed
country parties who have been slower to compromise and come forward with adequate financing to step
up to the plate and stop bracketing text on urgent issues. Remember that you need us, none of your
implementation strategies will work without the support and engagement of the world’s youth and we will
not stand for flimsy promises and stalled progress.

Finally, We have learned that several UNFCCC Secretariat staff working to liaise with observer
organisations will have to be laid off, with only two colleagues remaining. If governments are sincere
about meaningful participation of observers, then you MUST fulfill your financial pledges and provide ALL
the resources that the Secretariat needs as quickly as possible.

No One Can Play Poker Like The US

by Joe Perullo

There was a special Open-ended informal consultation on Wednesday organized by the president of the COP to discuss the possible Durban outcome.  There’s no definition on what the outcome is right now, but it will for sure address the concerns arising from the potential elimination of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.  The US was second or third on the initial speakers list, but strategically told the president that it was having “technical difficulties” and wouldn’t be ready to talk until later…

Indonesia took the floor, stressing the need for the conclusion of the Bali Action Plan (adaptation). Kenya and almost all others wanted a second commitment period to be part of the Durban package. Colombia and Cape Verde recognized the insufficiency of the KP (in both quantity of emission reductions required and implementation) and requested full operationalization of the Green Climate Fund, while The Bahamas mentioned how the amount of money in the Adaptation fund is insufficient.

Norway jumped on board with the developing countries stating its “faith in the facilitators.” This reveals the Scandinavian nation’s concerns over transparency in the process. Norway is a developed but non-essential player who wouldn’t be part of any side discussion by, say, the US, China, and India. With fears of being “left out of the room,” Norway called for the president and facilitators to keep the process opened for all the parties.

New Zealand stressed operationalization of the Cancun Agreements, which include the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Climate Technology Centre (CTC).

After all of these concerns of a Durban outcome were expressed, the US was finally ready to take the floor.  It played a wild card: instead of addressing the stated issues, the US ranted on how the AWG-LCA needed to be completed, meaning it should not be given any more time to address the five pillars of the Bali Road Map (shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology development and transfer, and finance). At the moment, LCA has barely finished developing policies for these, and has completely avoided mitigation.

Had the US said this in the beginning when it was supposed to, the other delegates would have focused their talks around keeping the LCA alive.  Soon after, the meeting was over and the US could slip out without having to defend itself from a torrent opposition.

Possible outcomes from Durban

by Samuli Sinisalo

After one week of negotiations, what are some of the possible outcomes we can expect from Durban?

The negotiations run on the two tracks: Kyoto Protocol and the Long term Cooperative Action.

From the Kyoto track, there are at least four possible outcomes:
1) No second commitment period is signed and Kyoto Protocol is buried and forgotten
2) Negotiations for second commitment period are extended by another year
3) The Kyoto Protocol is continued selectively with a political declaration
4) The Kyoto Protocol gets a second commitment period

From the Long Term Cooperative Action track I can think of at least five possible outcomes:
1) No agreement – the Bali Action Plan is buried and forgotten
2) The Bali Action Plan is concluded with a political declaration of emission reductions
3) The Bali Action Plan is not concluded, but extended for another year
4) The Bali Action Plan is rewritten into a new Durban negotiation mandate
5) The Bali Action plan is concluded by signing a new and ambitious legally binding instrument

The options above are listed in order apparent success. Number ones are the clear failures, which are hard to be spinned into successes by anyone.

Number two on both lists are the political declarations. This would be simply repeating the failure of Copenhagen. The political approach of pledge and review has been out there for two years now, and it can be seen that it is not the solution to the mitigation of climate change, nor to the adaptation. Especially under Kyoto Protocol it would be better to continue negotiations than to lock into low level of ambition and compromise the legally binding status of the Protocol.

Option 3 on KP track and options 3 and 4 on the LCA track all result in the continuation of negotiations. As I said, for KP it’s better to continue negotiating that to settle for a bad outcome. Under LCA, the negotiation mandate from Bali has already been extended twice. As long as real progress is made, extending it for another year might not be a bad idea. But renegotiating the negotiation mandate, turning the ambitious, comprehensive and equitable Bali Action Plan into a watered down Durban Mandate is not a good idea. The planet and the developing world only have things to lose if the Bali Action Plan is redefined.

The optimum outcome, the only real and unquestionable success from Durban would be the signing of the second commitment period under KP, and the non-KP Annex 1 Parties committing to comparable cuts under the LCA.

Whatever the combination of these two negotiating tracks is, we will see in about a week. The media, all over the world, is likely to call it a success. With this breakdown of the negotiations, you can analyze yourself what kind of success it really was. Unfortunately the negotiations are likely to go for the lowest common denominator and result in the least ambitious combination possible that can be spinned as success in the eyes of media and public. For the time being, Durban Disaster seems to be the most likely outcome from COP17.