All posts in COP17

Posted:
November 29, 2011
Author:
COA Students

Post-2012 Climate Regime: How Much Worse Can it Get?

[actually quite a lot]

by Trudi Zundel

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will end in 2012. In anticipation of that ending, Parties have been discussing what form the new UNFCCC commitments will take. The first item on the table: will there be a second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol?

Developed and developing countries have fundamentally different hopes for a Durban outcome. Developed countries are using this as an opportunity to drop out of a legally-binding protocol that they don’t support. In their opinion the KP is outdated, based on 1990 measures of “developed” and “developing” countries. China, Brazil, and India are considered developing countries under the UNFCCC, which means that their emissions are not legally restricted. Developed countries are saying that, based on total amounts emitted, these three countries are among the world’s highest emitters, and any protocol that doesn’t restrict them is useless. According to the USA, this is the reason that they refuse to sign onto the KP; really, though, for most developed countries, they don’t want to restrict their economy if their major economic competitors don’t have to.

The media has only been reporting that countries are working towards a treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, and ignoring the developing country goal of continuing commitments under the Kyoto Protocol with a complementary treaty alongside. This lack of coverage is a problem because it lowers public expectations about a second commitment period.

At COP13 in Bali, Parties agreed on the Bali Roadmap, which established a two-track system: one was a working group on the Kyoto Protocol, whose job was to improve and update the Protocol. The second was a working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA), spearheaded by the USA, whose task was to create an alternate mechanism to the Kyoto Protocol based on a shared vision among all UNFCCC parties. Now that the first commitment period of the Protocol is coming to an end, the future of these two tracks is uncertain: some of the most important negotiations here in Durban will be about the legal form of the LCA.

The legal form is very important. A new, legally-binding treaty that would replace the Kyoto Protocol would take a long time to develop and implement—during the lag-time, if the Kyoto Protocol did not continue, there would be no legal restrictions on emissions. A legally-binding treaty that would only complement the Kyoto Protocol, which is what some developing countries want, is also dangerous—legally, the most recent treaty takes precedence over earlier ones. If the new treaty is not as effective as Kyoto, it will still take legal precedence.

A new, non-legally binding treaty to replace Kyoto, which is what the US wants, would be based on a pledge-and-review system. This means that countries would commit to reduce however much they feel they can, and would not have a legal mechanism to make sure that they do even that.

The choice between a new treaty to replace Kyoto and one to complement it is a false dichotomy. Negotiators seem to be forgetting that any COP decision, like the one that came out of Cancun, is in fact legally-binding because countries are party to the UNFCCC, which is a legally-binding convention.  COP decisions do not need as much time to implement, because domestic governments do not need to ratify it. A COP decision to complement the Kyoto Protocol might be the best option for developing countries, especially given the urgency of climate change.

Politics of the New Treaty: What’s Likely to Happen?

On this issue, opinions can be reduced to a few main camps. Developed countries like Canada, Japan and Russia, spearheaded by the USA, want a non-legally binding mechanism that would replace the Kyoto Protocol. They would prefer a “pledge and review” system, in which countries determine for themselves how much they are able to reduce emissions.

The US has rigid demands for the LCA, and will not negotiate its stance under any circumstances. It wants a non-punitive pledge and review system; “symmetrical” legal obligations for developed and developing countries; and developing country pledges that are not conditional on finance.  This outcome would be disastrous for the climate—current pledges from countries under the KP would result in a global temperature rise of 5°C; without legal obligations they might fall further.

Canada has just formally announced at the COP that it is pulling out of the KP, although it has been saying this all year; Japan and Russia, too, will most likely not sign on.

The EU, who champions the “ethical developed country” cause, has said that it is open to a second commitment period, but only if other major economies (like the US, Canada, and Japan) commit, too. It will commit to a second period, however, only if there is an agreement to develop a new treaty to replace Kyoto after the second commitment period.

Developing countries are wholeheartedly in favour of a second commitment period,  but would like to see a new treaty that complements the Kyoto Protocol— it would bind the US and allow space for long-term finance, while keeping developed country commitments under the Protocol.

Neither of the opposing camps is willing to negotiate, and there is no point in having a new agreement or treaty that only  a few parties will sign onto. According to a presentation by the Third World Network yesterday, there are three possible Durban outcomes:

  1. The best deal ever!: Developing countries get everything they want—developed parties commit to a second commitment period of KP, there is a new treaty or decision alongside it that the US agrees to sign onto, in which it and other developed countries agree to longer-term finance. Emissions pledges under the second commitment period of the Protocol will limit global warming to 2°C, maybe even 1.5°.
  2. A bad deal: no second commitment period for major developed countries; a new legally-binding treaty to be developed— one that takes several years to develop, and locks in bad practices. Nothing is done for developing countries or the environment, but the multi-lateral negotiating process is saved! Any new regime will not be as strict as the Kyoto Protocol, because no developed countries would willingly sign onto something that asks more of them than the KP already does.
  3. The worst deal: Parties are at a standstill in negotiations, are not able to agree, and no deal is reached in Durban.

I understand the importance of optimism for activism. We can’t know what’s possible unless we try, etc, etc. However, I also think that it is both interesting and important to look at the best possible option within the political context. The first option above, which many NGOs and civil society groups are fighting for, is highly improbable (but I do hope that it happens). Most country positions are decided long before Durban—on issues as big as legal form, their positions are inflexible, and it’s too late now to change that. Those battles must be fought on the domestic level, long before COP rolls around. The second outcome is all too close for comfort. A new treaty would be negative progress—the proposals by the US (who holds the most power in the creation of the new regime, remember) allows developed countries to continue polluting while receiving credit for mitigation, and ignores their historical responsibility to help developing countries adapt.

Realistically, our best hope now is to do everything it takes to stop that regime change from being agreed. As Bolivia asserted in Cancun last year,  no deal is better than a bad deal. This is especially true when a legally-binding regime is on the line. We can’t let the urgency of climate change lead us to be roped into a “solution” that will make things worse than they already are.

Posted:
November 29, 2011
Author:
COA Students

Canada’s Idea of a Christmas Present: Backing Out of the Kyoto Protocol

~Graham Reeder

Recent information from CTV (a Canadian news agency) is showing that Canada is planning to formally back out of the Kyoto Protocol. Canada, along with Japan and Russia have been saying for a year that they do not want to make any new commitments to the Kyoto Protocol (KP) after this year, but backing out altogether places Canada in the same position as the US. This is part of a greater strategy from countries in the developed world to undermine the Kyoto Protocol, the only legally binding international document that ensures greenhouse gas reductions on behalf of both developed and developing countries.

The argument that these developed countries are touting is that the Kyoto commitments are only applicable for developed countries that are party to the KP, meaning that they do not include major emitters like China, India, and the US, and that a new treaty is needed that includes both developed and developing countries symmetrically. The truth is that emissions haven’t happened symmetrically: the developed countries that are bound by the Kyoto Protocol and the US are responsible for the vast majority of greenhouse gasses currently in the atmosphere as well as all of the current climate change being experienced. To expect countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa to pay for the mistakes of rich countries is a direct contradiction of the principles laid out in the UNFCCC and dooms us to a bottom up approach that effectively locks us into a 2-5 degrees C warmer world.

This latest development is a new low even for Canada. Canadian delegates have routinely blocked progress and lowered ambitions on all fronts at the UNFCCC, beating the US for Fossil of the Year Awards by Climate Action International for four years running, but pulling out of a legally binding protocol at such a crucial point is perhaps the biggest insult to the UN and to the rest of the world any Canadian government has committed. Canada regularly rides on its reputation of being an environmental leader, an international peacekeeper, and an all-round reasonably minded country, a reputation built for the most part by the Liberal Party of Canada in the late 20th century. The Conservatives have taken power in the last 10 years and have steadily undone almost everything that earned Canada that reputation over the past century; this could be the final blow. It is high time for Stephen Harper’s conservatives to step aside at the international level, they have shown that they are unwilling and unable to negotiate in good faith and should run back home before they embarrass Canadian citizens any further.

Posted:
November 27, 2011
Author:
COA Students

(The Lack of) High Hopes for Durban

by Samuli Sinisalo

On Monday the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change convenes for two weeks in Durban, South Africa. This is the 17th annual Conference of Parties, where parties come together to fulfill the framework convention. As the negotiations grow ever more technical and complex, it is good to keep in mind that the ultimate goal of the convetion is to stabilize the green house gases in the atmosphere to a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. But personally I am not having my hopes very high for any major breakthroughs to that direction this time. In fact, I would consider even a few very modest steps forward as major success in Durban.

The last comprehensive breakthrough within the UNFCCC context is the Bali Action Plan from 2007. In Bali a two track approach was designed, which would ensure a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol and another longer term solution for implementing the framework convention. These two tracks, or ad-hoc working groups, were given a two year mandate and were supposed to conclude their work in Copenhagen 2009. The Copenhagen conference failed to deliver, and the mandate of the working groups was extended to Cancun 2010.

Last year, few weeks before the Cancun negotiations began, the chair of one of the long term cooperative action track released a note by the chair which included the possible outcome for the negotiations. The Bali Action Plan from 2007 included five building blocks, which were shared vision, adaptation, mitigation, tech transfer and finance. The note by the chair in 2010 included four of these, but there was no outcome for mitigation. This to me describes the current state of the negotiations.

Mitigation is a key component of the negotiations. It is the most direct response for limiting the greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. At the same time it is potentially the most contested area in these negotiations. There are several probable reasons why the chair of the long term cooperative action group left mitigation out from his draft agreement prior to Cancun. Some possible explanations could be the legal form of the future commitments, the continuation of Kyoto Protocol, the role of major emitters and of course the ambition of mitigation targets. But in the end, all these boil down to the lack of political will to commit for binding domestic mitigation targets, in the developed countries. Consequently Cancun also failed to deliver and the mandate of the ad-hoc working groups was extended to Durban.

I do not think there will be a comprehensive outcome from Durban either. The most contested issues, the future of the Kyoto Protocol and the ambition of mitigation targets have not moved forward sufficiently prior to the meeting, and the political pressure has not increased sufficiently.

Personally I have put the bar for success in Durban really low. There are a few results I would like to see.

First and foremost, the UNFCCC has to maintain its credibility as the forum in which future climate decisions are held and decisions are made. If stalled continuously and indefinitely, the global political attention will shift and UNFCCC faces the threat of being sidelined and becoming irrelevant. In the future, climate decisions might take place outside the UN framework. Therefore Durban has to deliver.

The most obvious and necessary area to deliver is the finance. In Copenhagen, an agreement on finance was reached. Developed countries promised to mobilize 30bn in fast-track finance by 2012. In Copenhagen, the Conference of the Parties also decided to establish a Green Climate Fund, which would, by 2020, provide 100bn annually. A Transitional Committee was set up in Cancun to design the fund, and that committee is submitting its (contested) report to the Conference of the Parties in Durban. The fund has to become equitable and operational as the result of the Durban conference.

These two are my personal minimun expectations for COP-17 in Durban, and I hope not to be too badly disappointed. This is not to say there could be no positive results from other Bali Action Plan elements, such as tech transfer or adaptation. But I dare not hope for that. And I dare not even dream of second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol. But I hope I could dream to be positively surprised in Durban..

Posted:
November 26, 2011
Author:
COA Students

“Money doesn’t talk, it swears”

On the promise of the Green Climate Fund

by Nathan Thanki

Under the UNFCCC, expectations that the international community has regarding climate finance are clear. Article 4, paragraph 3 states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations,” and that there is a need for “adequacy and predictability” in the flow of these funds. Paragraph 4 elaborates that these commitments include helping developing countries “that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation needs.” Paragraph 7 says that the extent to which developing countries address climate change “will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments related to financial resources,” while paragraph 8 declares that the funds should be for meeting “the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures.”

That all seems fairly straightforward then: rich countries should give poor countries (in addition to existing aid) money specifically for both adapting to and mitigating climate change. However, as is always the case where money is involved, it is not so simple. Developed countries say, as they wash their hands of the responsibility of destroying the planet, that they are pouring money into climate financing. Developing countries say that they are seeing none of it, that they are funding many response efforts from their own budgets, that no money is given for badly needed adaptation projects, that most money goes to middle income countries like Brazil not the poorest countries like Zambia, and that the way climate financing is done is inappropriate as it gives too much power to the donor and not the recipient. There will be a few discussions around finance at Durban: reports on the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Adaptation Fund (AF) as well as from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). But perhaps the most highly controversial discussions will be around the new plan for long-term climate finance, the Green Climate Fund (GCF). So it is worth our time to know a little bit of the nitty-gritty.

 

Origins

The GCF was originally floated as an idea in Copenhagen, but was far overshadowed by the fiasco that was COP15. The figures of 30billion USD annually from 2010-2012 and 100billion USD annually by 2020 were conjured up, seemingly with no basis. As part of the Cancun agreements (1/CP.16 Para 4), it was decided that a Transitional Committee (TC) would meet throughout 2011 and come back to the COP in Durban with a design for the GCF. The TC was given some rough guidelines as to what the Fund structure should look like. The GCF should: be accountable to the COP; have a board of 12 developing country and 12 developed country members; have a trustee (The World Bank will serve as interim for 3 years) which holds the assets separately despite comingling, and which answers to the Board; have a separate secretariat; have 2 windows for mitigation and adaptation. Certain criteria were then laid out for how the TC itself should be structured: 15 developed and 25 developing countries, with consideration for gender balance; supported by various UN agencies, multilateral banks, international financial institutions and the UNFCCC secretariat; open for observers from civil society and the private sector.

 

The Design Process

The TC met this March in Mexico, and immediately formed 4 work-streams: scope, principles, cross cutting issues; governance; operational modalities; monitoring and evaluating. They also established a Technical Support Unit (TSU)—basically a group of finance and UN experts—to help the TC. By the second meeting in Tokyo, there were clear problems. Of the 5 chairs and co-chairs, developed countries had a 3/5 majority. Developing countries also complained of a lack of funding to assist them in attending TC meetings, and a conflict of interest in having the World Bank as trustee and in the TSU. Parties failed to make progress and by the fourth meeting in Cape Town this October, pretty much everything was still up for discussion. In governance, developed countries (led by the US) argued that the relationship of the COP to the GCF was advisory rather than supervisory, which developing countries strongly rejected. In the COP, developing countries are far more numerous, and so they want to make sure that decisions regarding their climate financing can be overseen by the whole world. In terms of structure, many developed countries (and developing countries with forests) want a separate funding window for REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation) and for the private sector, while G77 nations want windows for technology and capacity building instead. The role of the private sector is itself highly contested. Developed countries talk of a need to leverage private finance (by basically guaranteeing to bail out investors if they make reckless investments), but developing countries (mostly) maintain that funds should be public, and in the form of grants (NOT loans) that use direct access. Regarding the environmental safeguards which would ensure that funds go to projects that do not do more harm than good to people or planet, the US and Brazil oppose setting any, while developing countries like India want standards to apply to the private sector too. Many developing countries oppose calls (most loudly coming from the UK) that funds should be given in exchange for ‘verified results’, pointing out the obvious fact that a successful project cannot be implemented without funds.

 

Outcome

At the end of all that bickering, what was the outcome? A non-consensus paper <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/06.pdf>. The US and Saudi Arabia blocked consensus, meaning that the TC report to the COP will likely be re-opened for negotiating in Durban. The small gains made by developing countries may be held to ransom as part of a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ Durban package. Developed countries will probably push hard to ensure that developing countries should also donate to the fund, just as they are pushing hard for developing countries to sign on to a legally binding treaty for reducing emissions. Both amount to a blatant disregard of the Convention principles of polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibilities.

 

Our Demands

So if that is what to expect, then what should we demand? Throughout the TC meetings, civil society has been loudly and clearly calling for the following: at least 50% of funds should be for closing the adaptation gap; the Board should have non-voting members from civil society and affected communities; the GCF should be cautious when engaging the private sector so as not to risk public finance; funds must be available through direct access, grants should be used over loans, and in cases where loans are used they should not add to unsustainable debt; there should be no ‘gap’ in finance between 2012 and 2020; funds should be used for ambitious projects (for example, a mitigation project that reduces the most emissions); the GCF should have explicit legal personality, so that it does not rely on the World Bank; the amount of 100b USD is at best a conservative ballpark figure—many other studies have suggested that the amounts needed for developing countries to adequately adapt to and mitigate climate change are several times higher. The list of demands is long and includes reiterations of even basic principles such as transparency and strong safeguards, which really is depressing: it shows how much is still at risk.

 

Money matters

Ironically, as we go in to Durban the GCF looks the most likely issue to have an agreed outcome. If developed countries are to really do nothing to tackle climate chance, and instead renege on their Kyoto commitments, then they need a diversion. A large pot of money (or rather, the promise of such a pot—so far there is only $12b) would provide a good one. The promise of money, especially when that money is needed for developing countries’ survival, is a great negotiating tool for developed countries. I think of it more as a coercion tool. The US is holding out on the GCF so it can use it as part of a package later. For this reason, expect the issue of climate finance to be everywhere present at Durban.

 

 

 

← Older Entries
Newer Entries →