Getting a movement going

by Graham Reeder

So after two weeks of singing and dancing in designated, coordinated, preapproved, action spaces, the official youth constituency just made their first risky move at this COP. Anjali delivered a powerful high-level plenary intervention about how the youth are being failed and how developed countries are to blame for delay on ambitious climate action, and the youth followed it up by a powerful human microphone with the lines “Mic check! Equity Now! You’ve run out of excuses. We’re running out of time. Get it done! Get it done! Get it done!”  The Human Microphone (or the people’s microphone) has been a tactic used since before the World Trade Organization protest in 1999 but has recently made a comeback with the Occupy Movement.

What was truly incredible about this action was that it received consensus approval by the official youth constituency morning meeting.  Although it wasn’t clear whether or not this is an ‘unsanctioned action’, there is no doubt that it was a risk. The official youth constituency can’t approve unsanctioned action, and is usually very hesitant to push any aggressive messaging. Earth in Brackets is ecstatic to see the youth come together on the things that unite them and take a strong stance. I wonder though, why only now? Why is it that we have to wait until the last day of COP to get a sense of a movement being present in the halls of the ICC? My sense is that there were a lot of fears of people losing their badges and their chances of getting future accreditation. Although I understand this to a certain extent, I’m not sure I understand why it is that people are using such an intense amount of resources to get here and choosing not to speak up. Anjali made a good point in her intervention, ambition and action are not radical, what is radical is changing the climate of the earth, sitting back and letting it happen is radical too.  I’m concerned that I see a huge portion of the youth here itching for more risks but the sense of status quo remains dominant. I strongly commend the actions of the 6 Canadian youth who took a stand (literally) and interrupted the Canadian delegation’s speech to point out who they work for and the Abigail’s action for the American youth by obstructing Todd Stern’s public voice at the convention. Both of these actions have garnered attention from major western press outlets, I haven’t seen any sing-a-longs on the New York Times website recently. Their actions and others like them are what this movement takes, not a pep rally.

This doesn’t just go for the youth though, I’ve watched the largest environmental NGOs that have come to represent the environmental movement in the media continually cut dangerous deals and make compromises on issues that aren’t theirs to compromise on. I’m really concerned that a handful of European and North American non-grassroots NGOs are the ones who decide if Durban is a success or not for the media; it’s not up to them. There are plenty of grassroots organizations that represent a much broader constituency (and a much more vulnerable one) that have the opinions but not the voice, they end up leaving the room rather than taking it over.

My major questions are these: What does it take to develop a sense of ambition? How is it that activists and policy wonks like me can get the message across to civil society that their governments will have no interest in doing anything until something gets shoved down their throat by the people who elect them? In turn, what are the strategies that grassroots civil society groups can use to bring our governments’ attention span away in a real way from powerful dirty corporate lobbyists to a science and human rights based approach to climate change? How do we do the same with the top-down NGOs?

I’m not being naïve here, I understand that the fossil fuels industry is the most profitable industry in history and that, in turn, they have the most powerful lobby the western world has ever seen. I’m not particularly interested in either naïve idealism or lazy defeatism; I’m asking for concrete strategic thoughts and suggestions.

“Not just a fund-a JUST climate fund”

by Nathan Thanki

Before we get the official say on what the green climate fund should look like, let’s just remind ourselves what a really just GCF would look like. As one member of the YOUNGO finance working group said today “we don’t want just another climate fund, we want a just climate fund.” So what is a just climate fund?

First and foremost, a just fund must be a transparent fund that caters to the needs of the beneficiaries–developing countries. To this end, the GCF must be accountable to the COP and not the GCF Board, or the SBI. The Board will have a 50-50 split between developing and developed countries, which does not reflect the numbers within the UNFCCC and indeed the world. Basically, the developing countries should be able to decide how they spend the climate finance, rather than have those decisions dictated by the developed countries.

The GCF has to have a distinct legal personality so that it may enter into contracts and not rely on the personality of it’s trustee, at the moment the World Bank. The role of trustee must be clearly limited to simply holding funds for donors and giving it out as instructed by the board. At no time should the Trustee apply its own policies when disbursing funds. Developing countries rightly have a problem with the World Bank acting as Trustee given their previous experiences of structural readjustments resulting from debt on development aid and loans. They are worried that the same thing could happen with climate aid.

The Fund should be filled, as an empty piggy bank is still an empty piggy bank, no matter how well designed it is. The developed countries have to make sure the GCF can be up and running quickly – and this means paying for the set up to make sure the fund is ‘operational’ ASAP. Public funds (government money) should be used, not private investment. The private sector has no obligations under the Convention. There is no guarantee that the private sector investment won’t dry up. If we look at he Adaptation Fund we can see the danger of market based approaches. When the price of carbon went down, the Fund ran dry. Saying that, it is a recession after all, so perhaps we need innovation in funding? A financial transaction tax could generate enough money to fill the fund. These possibilities need to be explored and then specified in governments pledges and deliveries of finance.

Once the fund has been filled we can get to the business of spending. A just GCF would specify that at least 50% of funds go to adaptation projects. Adaptation is not a profitable business, it is a life saving business. It will not generate profits, and therefore the money given to these projects must be in the form of grants. Loans for adaptation are going to lead to unsustainable debt for developing countries. The problem is that if loans are offered, they will take them, because the need for adaptation is so great. There should be transparency in the spending process, definitely. The money needs to go to the most vulnerable, not the pockets of some corrupt manager or politician. But transparency does not equal donor countries being able to dictate to the recipient country on how they should spend the money. That is their decision: and who knows the needs of the poor more than the poor? Designated national agencies should be chosen by the recipient country, not the donor. Such restrictions are not just. Similarly, a results based approach is unfair. Adaptation projects do not yield very tangible, measurable results. Besides, money must come first, and then results. A lack of ‘results’ should not be used to block funding for adaptation projects.

And finally, what is a just fund if not a fund that is open to people? Civil society needs to be able to apply directly to the fund: we need a dedicated civil society window. The GCF Board has 2 civil society seats: we need more. It’s our money, after all. The TC report has made note of several constituencies; such as indigenous people. This is a step toward a just fund, but a truly just fund cannot ignore the youth constituency. We are more than half of the world, and it is us who will bear the full brunt of climate change. Some of us will pay with our homes and with our lives, it is totally unjust to not even recognise us as a stakeholder. It is our future that (isn’t) being funded.

Justice is not particularly forthcoming within the UNFCCC, we know this from bitter experience. And a just climate fund is 20 years overdue, so the likelihood of Durban delivering on that front is slim. That is not to say we won’t be told there is a great, shiny, new Fund; just like we’ll be told there is a wonderful new regime to save the planet. It is important to recognise progress when it has been made, but it is more important to be sure that it is for the right thing. An empty GCF in exchange for a Durban Mandate is not just stupid, it is suicidal. A just climate fund and a just climate regime based on principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and historical responsibility are demands that we must keep reiterating, till our voices are hoarse and the sun has set on Durban.

 

What happened to the hope of a green climate fund?

by Nathan Thanki

In our pre-COP speculations, everyone thought that the GCF would be one of the key issues and (possibly) outcomes of Durban. The promise–of a new, large, additional, transparent fund that would be driven by the countries that received the money and guaranteed adaptation funding–was great, a light at the end of the dark tunnel through which parts of the regime, like the continuation of Kyoto, might not make it. When the TC report came up on the COP plenary agenda, ears all over the ICC picked up. And yet since then there has been a resounding silence. So what’s been happening?

Many countries expressed dissatisfaction with elements of the TC report on the design of the GCF. Developing countries had many concerns–that this would become just another climate fund–and developed countries were concerned that the fund might actually be too recipient-driven and COP controlled. However, most countries thought it was better to have a compromised design than no fund at all. AOSIS practically begged Parties in the COP plenary to leave the text. Previously the US and Saudi Arabia had blocked consensus of the report as it was forwarded to the COP. But in the plenary, new voices of dissent emerge. ALBA–through Venezuela–began insisting they could not accept the text as it stood. Then COP president Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, reading from a script, declared the obvious: Parties have diverging views on the fund. She proposed that those with the biggest concerns get together and talk it over in an informal over which she would personally oversee. And just like that, the GCF disappeared from our radar.

Where it’s at now is somewhat unclear. Even after the US and ALBA looked certain to open the text, it appears that the COP presidency has kept it closed. Instead, Parties have been working in a very closed group, termed “Indabas”; a gathering,  or council of elders. We are essentially playing a waiting game to see what they come up with by the end of the week. The biggest concern right now is that some new text emerges out of the air that doesn’t reflect all Parties concerns. That’s some step down from the promise that the GCF was going into last week.

There are rumours around the halls of the ICC now that a deal has been struck. Saudi Arabia, the US, ALBA and Egypt have all been reportedly blocking progress by sticking to their positions. It seems now that something has given: but it is more likely that the sacrifices were in terms of an overall package. In other words, we will have a more or less structurally sound (apart from the concerns over a private sector facility) but empty Fund. In exchange for that, what did developing countries give up? We’ll know by tomorrow night for sure, but it can’t be good.

Hold your breath and read this

or “Technology Transfer to date in the negotiations”

by Anjali Appadurai

One of the more concrete outcomes from Cancun last year was the establishment of a new “Technology Mechanism“. This cross-cutting mechanism was intended to be the place where the entire technology transfer cycle across the Convention could be managed. The Tech Mechanism consists of two parts: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN). These two bodies are meant to work together to facilitate north-south and south-south flows of clean technology to help countries meet their emissions reduction targets.

The TEC is the policy arm of the Tech Mechanism; it guides the direction and strategy for technology development and transfer under the Convention. Made up of 20 executive members elected by the COP, the TEC is supposed to have equal representation from the global North and South.

The CTCN is a bit of a nebulous concept. It stands for Climate Technology Center and Network, yet to date no one really knows (Parties included) whether the Center and the Network will be two separate bodies or one integrated thing. Since the chair and vice chair of the TEC were decided in Panama (after lengthy discussions on whether a developed or developing nation official should have been the first Chair and vice-Chair, even though the positions rotate annually), the CTCN was the focus of half the discussions on tech transfer. It was handled under the subsidiary bodies (SBI/SBSTA).

Since the juicy stuff – IPRs and trade measures – were taken off the COP agenda and moved to informal meetings, us mere Observer parties were left with the dry bones of “host of the CTCN” and “modalities and procedures of the TEC” as topics to follow in negotiations. In case you’re already bored, I’ll try to make it as readable as possible.

Under the subsidiary bodies (the SBI and SBSTA), the talk centered around choosing the host for the CTCN. Discussions – both open and informal – laboured on for days before one of the co-chairs finally pointed out that there was no definition of “host” neither was there any definition of whether the CTCN would consist of a center, a network, or a combination of the two. This only made negotiations even more convoluted, and no decision was reached. There is, however, a detailed document elaborating how Parties may go about proposing a host, as well as an exhaustive list of criteria for this undefined host figure. The decision on this will probably be made sometime in early-mid 2012, but for now, I heard some juicy rumours floating around (some people in the YOUNGO working group on tech transfer are really good at sneaking up on negotiators and eavesdropping on their conversations).

First, a bit of background: India brought up a controversial proposition in one of the CTCN meetings. They called for increased financial support of the CTCN from the Global Environment Facility. The GEF, keep in mind, is a partner (and puppet) of the World Bank. Channeling funds from them into the CTCN would immediately give the WB influence over the CTCN’s activities – so this was already a contentious suggestion. A delegate from the Philippines later explained to me that India did this (and was supported by several other developing countries) as a way to get at least a bit of funding for the CTCN. The alternative would be the private sector initiatives pushed forward by the US (which, by the way, did get mentioned in the final decision because the US pushed so hard for them).

The first piece of gossip in the tech transfer hallways is that the GEF is putting in a bid to be the host of the CTCN. This would be a disaster for the future of tech transfer. The Technology Mechanism was created as a new mechanism last year, and the hope is that it will be fully operationalized by next year – there is great hope in this new beginning, and great potential for good things to be done to improve the flow and quality of technology to countries that need it. Instead, if the GEF ends up as the host, there would be a permanent WB presence in the tech transfer cycle.

Another rumour is that an Indian non-profit organization called The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), headed by Dr.R.K. Pachauri (also the head of the IPCC, which is the scientific body responsible for providing the “official” climate science to governments), is planning to put in a bid for host-ship. TERI aims to create “an environment that is enabling, dynamic and inspiring for the development of solutions to global problems in the fields of energy, environment and current patterns of development, which are largely unsustainable” (check out http://www.teriin.org). Now what a change in tune from the GEF! Moreover, TERI is based in India, which would place the CTCN leadership in the global South, where technology transfer should rightfully be based!

So there’s an update on the status of the Technology Mechanism. The latest (from today) is that the shortlist of hosts ranked in order of preference will be compiled by next August, and the host decided upon at COP18. Then maybe this Mechanism can finally get off the ground. So stay tuned!