All posts tagged Durban Mandate

Posted:
December 10, 2011
Author:
COA Students

unF**C our future

-nathan thanki

So while the AWG-KP plenary is suspended for Parties to get their heads together, let’s have a little fun. Late one night in the first week a few of us were sitting round the table of Hippo Hide backpackers. Samuli came in shouting about final outcomes, and we decided to all write down our predictions and keep them for the final night.

Well that night is now upon us friends. Here are our predictions. They’re all pretty grim, so we’re hoping against hope to be way off the mark.

Nathan: KP-2 will go ahead, with no/little reductions. Some sort of GCF will get approved – an empty shell, and some big concessions for developing countries. The price of this is that LCA will yield a new mandate for a climate regime involving all countries. India and China will be blamed. TEC and Adaptation Committee could go through but will be undermined later.

Graham: LCA will give us mandate for bottom up approach involving China, India, US. There will be a political KP-2, with more markets. India will lead blocking and get blamed. Loss and damage work programme will go through, NAPs won’t, Adaptation Committee will be blocked by SICA, there’ll be no GCF, the Adaptation fund is empty. Africa will sell out.

Samuli: We’ll get a political KP-2. LCA will be concluded with a durban mandate, consisting of 3 pillars: mitigation, adaptation, poverty eradication. To be concluded by 2015. The GCF will be established.

Anjali: KP-2 will happen. the BAP will continue but with more parties doing pledge and review under LCA (2018-2020). Japan and Canada will be doing that. The shared vision will be weak. The GCF will get established, but with too much private sector involvement and a private sector facility. The TEC will be launched, also with much private sector involvement.

Ethan (from SustainUS): The LCA will go out the window. There won’t be a KP-2. But CDM will be around for a while. GCF won’t be operational. There will be a 2nd transitional committee to re-design the GCF.

 

Currently it looks bad. Really bad. There are three options.

1. Collapse. Copenhagen take 2.

2. COP17 bis. In 6 months or so we’d have a resumed session to try and get it right.

3. The Durban Mandate gets pushed through as is. It’s the end of the UNFCCC (and the world) as we know it.

Posted:
December 8, 2011
Author:
COA Students

“Not just a fund-a JUST climate fund”

by Nathan Thanki

Before we get the official say on what the green climate fund should look like, let’s just remind ourselves what a really just GCF would look like. As one member of the YOUNGO finance working group said today “we don’t want just another climate fund, we want a just climate fund.” So what is a just climate fund?

First and foremost, a just fund must be a transparent fund that caters to the needs of the beneficiaries–developing countries. To this end, the GCF must be accountable to the COP and not the GCF Board, or the SBI. The Board will have a 50-50 split between developing and developed countries, which does not reflect the numbers within the UNFCCC and indeed the world. Basically, the developing countries should be able to decide how they spend the climate finance, rather than have those decisions dictated by the developed countries.

The GCF has to have a distinct legal personality so that it may enter into contracts and not rely on the personality of it’s trustee, at the moment the World Bank. The role of trustee must be clearly limited to simply holding funds for donors and giving it out as instructed by the board. At no time should the Trustee apply its own policies when disbursing funds. Developing countries rightly have a problem with the World Bank acting as Trustee given their previous experiences of structural readjustments resulting from debt on development aid and loans. They are worried that the same thing could happen with climate aid.

The Fund should be filled, as an empty piggy bank is still an empty piggy bank, no matter how well designed it is. The developed countries have to make sure the GCF can be up and running quickly – and this means paying for the set up to make sure the fund is ‘operational’ ASAP. Public funds (government money) should be used, not private investment. The private sector has no obligations under the Convention. There is no guarantee that the private sector investment won’t dry up. If we look at he Adaptation Fund we can see the danger of market based approaches. When the price of carbon went down, the Fund ran dry. Saying that, it is a recession after all, so perhaps we need innovation in funding? A financial transaction tax could generate enough money to fill the fund. These possibilities need to be explored and then specified in governments pledges and deliveries of finance.

Once the fund has been filled we can get to the business of spending. A just GCF would specify that at least 50% of funds go to adaptation projects. Adaptation is not a profitable business, it is a life saving business. It will not generate profits, and therefore the money given to these projects must be in the form of grants. Loans for adaptation are going to lead to unsustainable debt for developing countries. The problem is that if loans are offered, they will take them, because the need for adaptation is so great. There should be transparency in the spending process, definitely. The money needs to go to the most vulnerable, not the pockets of some corrupt manager or politician. But transparency does not equal donor countries being able to dictate to the recipient country on how they should spend the money. That is their decision: and who knows the needs of the poor more than the poor? Designated national agencies should be chosen by the recipient country, not the donor. Such restrictions are not just. Similarly, a results based approach is unfair. Adaptation projects do not yield very tangible, measurable results. Besides, money must come first, and then results. A lack of ‘results’ should not be used to block funding for adaptation projects.

And finally, what is a just fund if not a fund that is open to people? Civil society needs to be able to apply directly to the fund: we need a dedicated civil society window. The GCF Board has 2 civil society seats: we need more. It’s our money, after all. The TC report has made note of several constituencies; such as indigenous people. This is a step toward a just fund, but a truly just fund cannot ignore the youth constituency. We are more than half of the world, and it is us who will bear the full brunt of climate change. Some of us will pay with our homes and with our lives, it is totally unjust to not even recognise us as a stakeholder. It is our future that (isn’t) being funded.

Justice is not particularly forthcoming within the UNFCCC, we know this from bitter experience. And a just climate fund is 20 years overdue, so the likelihood of Durban delivering on that front is slim. That is not to say we won’t be told there is a great, shiny, new Fund; just like we’ll be told there is a wonderful new regime to save the planet. It is important to recognise progress when it has been made, but it is more important to be sure that it is for the right thing. An empty GCF in exchange for a Durban Mandate is not just stupid, it is suicidal. A just climate fund and a just climate regime based on principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and historical responsibility are demands that we must keep reiterating, till our voices are hoarse and the sun has set on Durban.

 

Posted:
December 8, 2011
Author:
COA Students

African Anger at European Calls for A ‘New Mandate’

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Civil society groups attack ‘Durban Mandate’ proposal as a ‘great escape’

DURBAN, SOUTH AFRICA – Today – Civil society leaders from across Africa, with support from global movements, launched a letter to climate negotiators that warns that focusing on launching a new mandate at the Durban talks risks backtracking on promises to the poor and the planet.

The letter calls on developed countries to urgently scale up the ambition of their emission reduction targets and reminds negotiators that current emission reduction pledges will lead us to a world that is 5°C warmer. For Africa, this means 7 or 8°C of warming and unimaginable human suffering.

Michele Maynard from the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance said:

“Following what some delegates say you would think that the purpose of these negotiations was a ‘new roadmap’ – that’s just not true. Of central and agreed importance is the need to negotiate deep emission cuts as a part of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Coming up with new ‘mandates’ and ‘roadmaps’ is a distraction from that very necessary action. It’s also a breach of faith, in 2007 all countries agreed to do this.”

“A climate agreement that does what is necessary to protect Africa is like cooking a good recipe. It needs just enough emission cuts and a dollop of finance and technology for responding to climate impacts. We’ve got the recipe from the Bali Action Plan, we’ve got all the ingredients, even started cutting up some of the vegetables, but now some people want to cook something else. That’s a recipe for doing-nothing and delay.”

“This letter is a clarion call to negotiators – you either see the science and recognize its urgency; or you don’t. You either hear what the world’s poorest people are saying and care; or you don’t. Any outcome which locks in the current proposed emission cuts or puts off talking about how to bring those cuts into line with the science is utterly unacceptable.”

The letter says that agreeing to a new mandate that replaces the Kyoto Protocol would mean action is effectively delayed for five to ten years. A new treaty will take several years to negotiate with several more years needed for ratification. Further, there is no assurance that countries that have repudiated the existing legal architecture, like the United States, will agree to or ratify a new agreement, nor that such agreement will not be a weak and ineffective “pledge and review” system.

While many developed countries seek to end the Kyoto Protocol, they simultaneously attempt to retain and expand their favored elements of the Kyoto Protocol, like the CDM, in a new agreement and shift their responsibilities onto developing countries.

Without legally binding emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries must not be allowed to have access to the carbon markets.

CSO LETTER No Durban mandate for the great escape As African civil society and international allies, we reject the call of many developed countries for a so-called “Durban mandate” to launch new negotiations for a future climate framework. A new mandate for a new treaty in place of the Kyoto Protocol should be understood for what it really is – rich countries backtracking and reneging on “inconvenient” obligations, at the expense of the poor and the planet. While developed countries may appear progressive by asking for a mandate to negotiate a new legally binding treaty, the truth is that this is nothing but a veiled attempt to kill the Kyoto Protocol and escape from their further mitigation obligations under the already existing mandate in the Protocol itself, and the agreement in 2005 for negotiating further emission cuts. A political declaration to continue the KP is, in practice, another nail in its coffin. Anything less than a formal legal amendment and ratification process, will deliver an empty shell of the Kyoto Protocol. Agreeing to a new mandate would mean action is effectively delayed for five to ten years. A new treaty will take several years to negotiate with several more years needed for ratification. Further, there is no assurance that countries that have repudiated the existing legal architecture, like the United States, will agree to or ratify a new agreement, nor that such agreement will not be a weak and ineffective “pledge and review” system. Developed countries must urgently scale up the ambition of their emission reduction targets. As the latest reports by the International Energy Agency make clear, deep emission cuts are needed now to have a realistic chance of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C. Current emission reduction pledges will lead us to a world that is 5°C warmer. For Africa, this means 7 or 8°C of warming and unimaginable human suffering. This is why a pledge-based approach with weak review rules, instead of the Kyoto Protocol’s approach of legally binding commitments and international rules that give meaning to these commitments, is completely insufficient to ensure the necessary emission cuts. While many developed countries condition any further action, including fulfilling their legally binding obligations to a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, on greater action by emerging economies, developing country pledges already far outweigh pledges by developed countries. In fact, with accounting loopholes and the use of carbon markets, developed countries could make no net contribution to reducing emissions by 2020. While many developed countries seek to end the Kyoto Protocol, they simultaneously attempt to retain and expand their favored elements of the Kyoto Protocol, like the CDM, in a new agreement and shift their responsibilities onto developing countries. Without legally binding emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol, developed countries must not be allowed to have access to the carbon markets. Further, with the price of carbon crashing, paltry emissions reductions pledges from developed countries, there is no rationale for the continuation of the CDM or the creation of new market mechanisms. Developed countries must scale up their ambition and stop blaming other countries who have contributed far less to the climate crisis, yet are taking on more aggressive action. Developing countries are living up to their promises made in Bali, while developed countries are attempting to re-write the rules of the game to avoid meeting their obligations. Developed countries are also denying developing countries the necessary finances and technology to address the climate crisis. The provision of finance from developed to developing countries is an obligation in and of itself. It must not be used as a bargaining chip in the Durban negotiations, nor should it be dangled in front of poor countries as a bribe to get agreement for a very bad mitigation deal. The same applies to the operationalization of the Green Climate Fund. Success in Durban depends on the Green Climate Fund not being an empty, ineffective shell. We will not accept a “Durban mandate” or any outcome that locks in the current low ambition and inaction for many years, and condemns billions of people in Africa and across the world to suffer the worst impacts of a warming world.

Signed by: Africa Trade Network
Alternative Information Development Centre
Democratic Left Front
Friends of the Earth International
groundWork,
Friends of the Earth, South Africa
Pan African Climate Justice Alliance
Rural Women’s Alliance
South Durban Community Environmental Alliance
Southern African Faith Communities’ Environment Institute
Third World NetworkTrust for Community Outreach and Education

Posted:
December 6, 2011
Author:
COA Students

The Great Escape

Or “How they help us help ourselves lose the fight”

by Anjali Appadurai

Is the climate regime unraveling before our eyes in Durban?

There are some scary indications that it is. Some Parties are “cautiously optimistic” (India), some are “reasonably optimistic” (Brazil) and some believe that this is all going down the drain (a different Indian negotiator). The truth is, expectations are all over the place at this particular COP. So much hangs in the balance – the future of the Kyoto Protocol, the establishment of a Green Climate Fund, the launching of a new Technology Mechanism, a new Adaptation Committee , the founding principles of the Convention itself – and negotiators have so much at stake that they could really go either way on these issues.

The biggest topic on the table at the moment is the question of the “Durban Mandate”, a phantom whose two-faced visage hangs over the negotiations, gaining strength by the day. Like Samuli wrote,  there are several shapes this Mandate could take. The idea I’ll deal with in this post is that developed countries would sign an entirely new treaty under the LCA, leaving the Kyoto Protocol behind and starting afresh, while developing countries would take on their own commitments as per their abilities. The US has expressed that in order for them to sign this treaty, it would have to include all “major emitters” – namely India and China. India has all but blocked this prospect, eliciting backlash from various groups (more on that later).

What are the problems with such a new treaty? Well, there are several. First off, as AOSIS, Africa Group and BASIC emphasize – we already have a treaty. The Bali Action Plan is a COP decision, which under the UNFCCC is legally-binding in the fullest sense of the word. The BAP, intended to supplement the KP,  seemed to be a fair deal – Annex 1 (developed countries) would continue with the KP and reduce emissions by 40%, the US would do something comparable but not as binding under the LCA (this is called ‘shared vision’) and developing countries would act according to their abilities. Ditching the Bali Action Plan in favour of something new would simply be a way for A1 countries to be let off the hook while appearing to be committed to emission reduction action. The key here is that any new treaty would be based upon a “pledge and review” (PAR) system, which removes binding obligations based upon historical responsibility (one of the foundational principles of the Convention). Is it worth it to abandon our existing frameworks (BAP, KP)? Does it not send the message that we have failed in what we set out to do? There are four developed-country scenarios for the PAR system – they range from “low-end pledges with loopholes” (the worst) to “high-end pledges without loopholes” (the best). Under the first scenario, pledges could be as low as -6% emissions reductions. That’s an increase in emissions by 6%! Even if developed countries didn’t use the loopholes and kept to their pledges, it would still be very difficult to achieve global peaking of GHG emissions by 2015, which is what we want. The PAR system could work in some type of world in which countries understood the scope and urgency of the problem, but in this world, the pledges are too low, the action too weak, and the system ineffective.

The Durban Mandate – the way it’s being talked about – is a great escape. It opens the back door for A1 countries to run away from their commitments completely, while still maintaining face.

On a parallel track – the future of the Kyoto Protocol is the future of the mitigation regime as a whole. This is inextricably linked to the issue of the Durban Mandate. The second commitment period of the KP is not negotiable – when countries signed onto the KP back in ’97, it was directly implied that they would continue their commitments through a second commitment period. Furthermore, in the original negotiations about the KP second commitment period, all countries agreed to adopt the IPCC science-based reports that called for 25-40% reductions as an aggregate target.

A misconception was spread prior to this conference that the KP “expires” in 2012. Terms like “post-Kyoto” have been floating around in various places, subtly shaping expectations for the outcome in Durban. There was talk (and still is) of a “political second commitment period”, which would comprise a period of time resembling a commitment period during which PAR would be the basis for emissions reductions. At this point in the negotiations, it would be embarrassing for A1 countries to abandon the Protocol altogether (although Canada, Japan and Russia don’t seem to mind). It looks like they’ll put it on life support for a little while – a way to showcase its haggard face as a success of Durban: Look! We kept the KP alive! We are the heroes of the climate regime.

The form this takes is the “EU roadmap”: take on a second commitment period, but with huge conditions. Involve the “major emitters”. We’ll talk about further steps in 2015 or 2020 when it’s too late.

This shaping of expectations, then grand unveiling of a roadmap that seems great but is really the biggest sellout of the conference is particularly harmful because it affects the perception of civil society as well. NGOs have started to support the EU roadmap and call for BASIC countries (who are for the most part opposed to it, especially India) to support it. In a press briefing with India just a few days ago, several different members of civil society (from environmental groups or the press) asked the same question in an accusatory tone: why won’t India comply with the EU’s “legally-binding treaty”? India’s reply was consistent: perhaps we haven’t made ourselves clear enough, but we are not major emitters – we are an enormous country with a very small per-capita carbon footprint, and to put us at the same level as A1 countries is to undermine the very principles of the Convention and to shift the focus of obligation to developing countries.

And right they are.

To push forward the idea that the purpose of Durban is to create a new treaty is a grand sellout. It’s a great escape because the strategy employed is that of “divide and conquer”, wherein countries sell out one by one like dominoes, upending any consolidated effort from groups such as the G77.

It’s a great escape because cleverly disguised policies convince our “own” people to help us lose the fight. Misinformation, lopsided media attention and subtle messaging get across ideas that are harmful to the support we should be giving – as civil society – to constructive, responsible, ambitious policies. I’m sure we are victims of the same game in many ways. I know that my understanding of these issues is not whole or complete or as well-informed as I’d like it to be. But as civil society we must make it our imperative to acknowledge that and strive to support the fairest, most ambitious actions being taken at the UNFCCC today.

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