Hold your breath and read this

or “Technology Transfer to date in the negotiations”

by Anjali Appadurai

One of the more concrete outcomes from Cancun last year was the establishment of a new “Technology Mechanism“. This cross-cutting mechanism was intended to be the place where the entire technology transfer cycle across the Convention could be managed. The Tech Mechanism consists of two parts: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN). These two bodies are meant to work together to facilitate north-south and south-south flows of clean technology to help countries meet their emissions reduction targets.

The TEC is the policy arm of the Tech Mechanism; it guides the direction and strategy for technology development and transfer under the Convention. Made up of 20 executive members elected by the COP, the TEC is supposed to have equal representation from the global North and South.

The CTCN is a bit of a nebulous concept. It stands for Climate Technology Center and Network, yet to date no one really knows (Parties included) whether the Center and the Network will be two separate bodies or one integrated thing. Since the chair and vice chair of the TEC were decided in Panama (after lengthy discussions on whether a developed or developing nation official should have been the first Chair and vice-Chair, even though the positions rotate annually), the CTCN was the focus of half the discussions on tech transfer. It was handled under the subsidiary bodies (SBI/SBSTA).

Since the juicy stuff – IPRs and trade measures – were taken off the COP agenda and moved to informal meetings, us mere Observer parties were left with the dry bones of “host of the CTCN” and “modalities and procedures of the TEC” as topics to follow in negotiations. In case you’re already bored, I’ll try to make it as readable as possible.

Under the subsidiary bodies (the SBI and SBSTA), the talk centered around choosing the host for the CTCN. Discussions – both open and informal – laboured on for days before one of the co-chairs finally pointed out that there was no definition of “host” neither was there any definition of whether the CTCN would consist of a center, a network, or a combination of the two. This only made negotiations even more convoluted, and no decision was reached. There is, however, a detailed document elaborating how Parties may go about proposing a host, as well as an exhaustive list of criteria for this undefined host figure. The decision on this will probably be made sometime in early-mid 2012, but for now, I heard some juicy rumours floating around (some people in the YOUNGO working group on tech transfer are really good at sneaking up on negotiators and eavesdropping on their conversations).

First, a bit of background: India brought up a controversial proposition in one of the CTCN meetings. They called for increased financial support of the CTCN from the Global Environment Facility. The GEF, keep in mind, is a partner (and puppet) of the World Bank. Channeling funds from them into the CTCN would immediately give the WB influence over the CTCN’s activities – so this was already a contentious suggestion. A delegate from the Philippines later explained to me that India did this (and was supported by several other developing countries) as a way to get at least a bit of funding for the CTCN. The alternative would be the private sector initiatives pushed forward by the US (which, by the way, did get mentioned in the final decision because the US pushed so hard for them).

The first piece of gossip in the tech transfer hallways is that the GEF is putting in a bid to be the host of the CTCN. This would be a disaster for the future of tech transfer. The Technology Mechanism was created as a new mechanism last year, and the hope is that it will be fully operationalized by next year – there is great hope in this new beginning, and great potential for good things to be done to improve the flow and quality of technology to countries that need it. Instead, if the GEF ends up as the host, there would be a permanent WB presence in the tech transfer cycle.

Another rumour is that an Indian non-profit organization called The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), headed by Dr.R.K. Pachauri (also the head of the IPCC, which is the scientific body responsible for providing the “official” climate science to governments), is planning to put in a bid for host-ship. TERI aims to create “an environment that is enabling, dynamic and inspiring for the development of solutions to global problems in the fields of energy, environment and current patterns of development, which are largely unsustainable” (check out http://www.teriin.org). Now what a change in tune from the GEF! Moreover, TERI is based in India, which would place the CTCN leadership in the global South, where technology transfer should rightfully be based!

So there’s an update on the status of the Technology Mechanism. The latest (from today) is that the shortlist of hosts ranked in order of preference will be compiled by next August, and the host decided upon at COP18. Then maybe this Mechanism can finally get off the ground. So stay tuned!

Elusive Unity

by Julian Velez

Unity between the different groups is a key aspect for the outcome of these negotiations, because that is how strong positions on the decisions come about and also that is how agreements come forward. If each country only pushed for their agenda and their agenda only, nothing would happen. Countries work as blocks to find united positions that give strength to their statements. The political influence of block positions becomes a force that can shift things in negotiations. This is particularly important for poor countries because otherwise their small voices wouldn’t be heard in this concert of giants.

Right now the developing economies are not finding a united voice. There is division and they are starting to have conflicts between each others’ positions when their interests are shared within their climatic and economic reality. Developing countries are the ones that are most affected by climate change. They are minor emitters in relation to the developed countries which not only have much higher per capita emissions, but also have a long history of emissions that has brought us to this crucial moment with the world’s environment.

The role of the African countries is crucial for the direction that these negotiations will take. They are being pressured to be divided. The Africa Group is trying to have a united vision for the outcome of Durban; we will see what happens when the ministers and the heads of state come in. These official figures don’t deal with details of the text – they deal with big political deals that are country-driven. They also have interests that are for personal political campaigns. The problem is that some countries have sold out in backdoor financial deals with threats and offers. When this happens, the country blocks can’t make statements as a whole.

The main issue is that the developed countries are pushing for a commitment that will relieve them from more responsibilities rather than giving them the responsibility to fulfill obligations that they had already signed to.  Developed countries are pushing for a deal that will create a good image for them and the Durban COP, while not really holding them to hard obligations. They want to show that they worked hard for a tangible result.

Right now it seems that most developing countries agree with the terms for the outcomes of these conference. Except for AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States), which doesn’t have a unified position, even publicly.  For example they all want an ambitious, legally binding second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol. The question in this conference is not whether we have a second commitment period or not – we will have one – the discussion is on how that decision is made. The question is: when it starts operating, how ambitious will it be in terms of emissions reductions, when do certain major emitter parties come into the protocol, and under what conditions they will join the commitment. In a general sense developed countries want to have less pressure for their commitments and developing countries want stronger commitments for developed ones at all levels.

Yesterday the High Level Segment of the convention started; these negotiations are carried forward by ministers and heads of state. Now it all depends on how strong developing countries stand with their block position and whether or not they sell out their position, and with it, the united voice of their group. Another factor is how much developed countries use development aid as a manipulative tool to push their own agendas. It is in this high level segment that all the big deals and bribes happen.

The Great Escape

Or “How they help us help ourselves lose the fight”

by Anjali Appadurai

Is the climate regime unraveling before our eyes in Durban?

There are some scary indications that it is. Some Parties are “cautiously optimistic” (India), some are “reasonably optimistic” (Brazil) and some believe that this is all going down the drain (a different Indian negotiator). The truth is, expectations are all over the place at this particular COP. So much hangs in the balance – the future of the Kyoto Protocol, the establishment of a Green Climate Fund, the launching of a new Technology Mechanism, a new Adaptation Committee , the founding principles of the Convention itself – and negotiators have so much at stake that they could really go either way on these issues.

The biggest topic on the table at the moment is the question of the “Durban Mandate”, a phantom whose two-faced visage hangs over the negotiations, gaining strength by the day. Like Samuli wrote,  there are several shapes this Mandate could take. The idea I’ll deal with in this post is that developed countries would sign an entirely new treaty under the LCA, leaving the Kyoto Protocol behind and starting afresh, while developing countries would take on their own commitments as per their abilities. The US has expressed that in order for them to sign this treaty, it would have to include all “major emitters” – namely India and China. India has all but blocked this prospect, eliciting backlash from various groups (more on that later).

What are the problems with such a new treaty? Well, there are several. First off, as AOSIS, Africa Group and BASIC emphasize – we already have a treaty. The Bali Action Plan is a COP decision, which under the UNFCCC is legally-binding in the fullest sense of the word. The BAP, intended to supplement the KP,  seemed to be a fair deal – Annex 1 (developed countries) would continue with the KP and reduce emissions by 40%, the US would do something comparable but not as binding under the LCA (this is called ‘shared vision’) and developing countries would act according to their abilities. Ditching the Bali Action Plan in favour of something new would simply be a way for A1 countries to be let off the hook while appearing to be committed to emission reduction action. The key here is that any new treaty would be based upon a “pledge and review” (PAR) system, which removes binding obligations based upon historical responsibility (one of the foundational principles of the Convention). Is it worth it to abandon our existing frameworks (BAP, KP)? Does it not send the message that we have failed in what we set out to do? There are four developed-country scenarios for the PAR system – they range from “low-end pledges with loopholes” (the worst) to “high-end pledges without loopholes” (the best). Under the first scenario, pledges could be as low as -6% emissions reductions. That’s an increase in emissions by 6%! Even if developed countries didn’t use the loopholes and kept to their pledges, it would still be very difficult to achieve global peaking of GHG emissions by 2015, which is what we want. The PAR system could work in some type of world in which countries understood the scope and urgency of the problem, but in this world, the pledges are too low, the action too weak, and the system ineffective.

The Durban Mandate – the way it’s being talked about – is a great escape. It opens the back door for A1 countries to run away from their commitments completely, while still maintaining face.

On a parallel track – the future of the Kyoto Protocol is the future of the mitigation regime as a whole. This is inextricably linked to the issue of the Durban Mandate. The second commitment period of the KP is not negotiable – when countries signed onto the KP back in ’97, it was directly implied that they would continue their commitments through a second commitment period. Furthermore, in the original negotiations about the KP second commitment period, all countries agreed to adopt the IPCC science-based reports that called for 25-40% reductions as an aggregate target.

A misconception was spread prior to this conference that the KP “expires” in 2012. Terms like “post-Kyoto” have been floating around in various places, subtly shaping expectations for the outcome in Durban. There was talk (and still is) of a “political second commitment period”, which would comprise a period of time resembling a commitment period during which PAR would be the basis for emissions reductions. At this point in the negotiations, it would be embarrassing for A1 countries to abandon the Protocol altogether (although Canada, Japan and Russia don’t seem to mind). It looks like they’ll put it on life support for a little while – a way to showcase its haggard face as a success of Durban: Look! We kept the KP alive! We are the heroes of the climate regime.

The form this takes is the “EU roadmap”: take on a second commitment period, but with huge conditions. Involve the “major emitters”. We’ll talk about further steps in 2015 or 2020 when it’s too late.

This shaping of expectations, then grand unveiling of a roadmap that seems great but is really the biggest sellout of the conference is particularly harmful because it affects the perception of civil society as well. NGOs have started to support the EU roadmap and call for BASIC countries (who are for the most part opposed to it, especially India) to support it. In a press briefing with India just a few days ago, several different members of civil society (from environmental groups or the press) asked the same question in an accusatory tone: why won’t India comply with the EU’s “legally-binding treaty”? India’s reply was consistent: perhaps we haven’t made ourselves clear enough, but we are not major emitters – we are an enormous country with a very small per-capita carbon footprint, and to put us at the same level as A1 countries is to undermine the very principles of the Convention and to shift the focus of obligation to developing countries.

And right they are.

To push forward the idea that the purpose of Durban is to create a new treaty is a grand sellout. It’s a great escape because the strategy employed is that of “divide and conquer”, wherein countries sell out one by one like dominoes, upending any consolidated effort from groups such as the G77.

It’s a great escape because cleverly disguised policies convince our “own” people to help us lose the fight. Misinformation, lopsided media attention and subtle messaging get across ideas that are harmful to the support we should be giving – as civil society – to constructive, responsible, ambitious policies. I’m sure we are victims of the same game in many ways. I know that my understanding of these issues is not whole or complete or as well-informed as I’d like it to be. But as civil society we must make it our imperative to acknowledge that and strive to support the fairest, most ambitious actions being taken at the UNFCCC today.

Speak for Yourself

by Katie O’Brien

I cannot speak for anyone other than myself. It seems obvious—at least to me it does—because how can I speak on things I have not experienced myself? But this is exactly the problem with the UNFCCC process (and other processes as well but lets not go into that today): speaking on behalf of people. I suppose my statement wasn’t entirely true because in applying to be a Sierra Student Coalition delegate I was chosen (hopefully) with the confidence that I could accurately speak for and represent the SSC at these negotiations and in working groups. But I don’t think I can extend my power of speech beyond that. At the same time I feel like my voice is already represented and I feel that there are many others not represented. So I would like to speak for them but I cannot. I am privileged. I am a white, upper-middle class North American female who speaks English, has never had to worry about food, is able-bodied, of sound mind, and who goes to a private liberal-arts college in Maine. At the same time you can’t just boil me down to this. I am still a young person who cares about our future, I am a human and so I care about other humans’ lives and their experiences, and I am a being on this Earth who cares about what happens to its climate and to its biodiversity. My privilege has allowed me to speak about these cares but has silenced the voices of many South African youth and countless other peoples who have these concerns and more. And this is only within YOUNGO (the youth constituency). In the actual negotiations my voice is barely heard above the roars of those who represent me. So what about those who don’t even have the agency to come here and attempt to shout?

I suppose this is not a problem with all of the UNFCCC. I feel like many African and Small Island States are accurately representing their people’s sentiments. I’ve been to a few side-events with speakers from these areas and many of them reference their lives before being in government, back when they too were just people. They speak of their experiences in their lives of the effects of climate change where they are from. But like I said earlier, I cannot speak for them and really I have no idea what I am talking about. But as a Canadian and a pseudo-American, I can say delegations like the United States and Canada are not accurately representing their people. These delegates are listening to the corporations over the people; I suppose money is louder than real words. The delegates themselves are not to blame, the people did not choose the delegates, but someone the people thought represented them chose the delegates.

Maybe it sounds as if I am just going with the times of the Occupy movements, but I feel like this system is broken and I have for some time. I have felt for a long time that we need a more fair and accurately represented governing body. The system here is just as corrupted and convoluted as our political process at home because our politicians back home choose the people here.

Despite all of this I still am trying to work here and make a difference in some way. I am in the YOUNGO Water Working Group and we are working towards getting a larger focus on water, to us it seems to be only slipped in as footnotes and is ignored. But it has become apparent to us that this will take some time. Instead we hope to make some noise and establish this group and have a larger basis to continue this work. We have gained attention from other countries and organizations looking for the same thing and we hope we can use our unique position as youth to bring these issues to more light.

Is this worth it? If this is such a broken system shouldn’t we work to fix the system or create a new one?

I feel I have to think that it is worth it. Just as how I feel it is worth it to fight for climate justice in the United States despite how many people tell me it is dismal. I have to fight because I never know who might hear me screaming my lungs out at what seems to be just a blank wall of a building filled with deaf people. And I remember that I have so many people here at the negotiations and back home who care just as much as me and are working just as hard or harder at making sure people hear us. I have to work at this because if I don’t than why should any of them work on it? We can’t let things continue the way they have. We have to be loud and we have to work at these issues until we can say they have been solved. That means working on them in all theaters, within this broken convoluted system as well as outside so that maybe, just maybe something actually happens.