Adaptation negotiations stall as the rift between Rich and Poor grows

~by Graham Reeder

Today's adaptation negotiations took a turn for the worse as developed and developing countries started to disagree about implementation issues. The Bonn adaptation meetings have focused on two important pieces of the Cancun Adaptation Framework: the Work Programme on Loss and Damage and the support for the National Adaptation Plans. The Loss and Damage stream is important for making sure that countries are able to deal with the impacts of climate change related events like natural disasters, sea level rise, and drought. If they don't have help with these impacts, they will incur the costs of something they had no part in creating; this would be a grave injustice. The National Adaptation Plans (or NAPs) are to support developing countries to come up with and implement plans that will integrate medium and long term climate change adaptation into their development plans. The NAPs are supposed to build on the National Adaptation Programmes of Action for the urgent needs of Least Development Countries which are moving towards their implementation phase now.

The 'adaptation community', as they like to call themselves, are a small group of negotiators who work closely together on all the issues. The major players are from the US, the EU, Canada, Australia, Norway; Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Argentina for the G77; Nauru and the Cook Islands for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS); Bhutan and Timor Leste for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs); and Tanzania and Ghana for the African Group. The former US negotiator for adaptation, who has been around for some time, retired this year and her secessor is in her first meetings of these kinds. I haven't been able to gather any information about her, but she seems like an highly competent professional who seems to have a lot of experience in the adaptation field that goes beyond the UNFCCC, though she is a less experience negotiator, she will definitely be a force to be reckoned with in years to come. Ever since I started following adaptation negotiations in Cancun, they have moved along quite productively and have worked through disagreements and made compromises together.

Today, however, was a total change of atmosphere. It started off in the consultations on Loss and Damage, where the Canadian and Argentinian co-chairs presented their draft text that quite explicitly excluded calls from the G77+China to develop a mechanism to address Loss and Damage, when COA's very own Juan Pablo Hoffmaister ('07) for Bolivia pointed this out, developed countries retorted that  laying the foundations of a mechanism would be premature given that the work programme still needs to conduct 3 more workshops. This is a common tactic from developed countries: they call for more information, more workshops, and more academic exercises as long as developing countries want action and implementation and things aren't going their way, but as soon as they frame the debate in their own terms (read: more work for developing countries) they call for urgency of action. As developed and developing countries went back and forth on the issue of creating a mechanism, negotiations didn't seem to go anywhere, and the chair ended up proposing that the group meet again immediately before COP 18 in Doha, Qatar. This seems like a desperate effort to accommodate everyone, but is unfortunate given that reports from these meetings are supposed to reflect submissions from all parties, not just developed country parties.

The tension picked up again in the working group on NAPs. Philippines negotiator Bernarditas Castro Muller (one of the best negotiators for the G77 and the biggest thorn in the US' side, she really knows her convention and how to negotiate and has been called the 'Dragon Woman', the US tried to have her fired before Copenhagen, but Sudan hired her right back on) has been sitting in on NAP negotiations, which is unusual for a negotiator of her status. This gives us a clear indication that the issues being discussed are broader than they appear, namely, that they relate to finance. Bernarditas was there to point out that funds for adaptation need to be scaled up and that reform of the way that adaptation work is implemented (or isn't) by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) needs to happen. After noting that, she pointed out that the NAP process needed to not just be for LDCs, but for all developing countries and that developed countries were trying to shirk their responsibilities under the convention. This fight wouldn't normally come up so bluntly, it has been an underlying conflict since Cancun and a compromise of relatively vague language on this issue was reached in Durban, but her bringing it up so aggressively represents larger political manoeuvring at play.

I suspect that the source of this manoeuvring can be traced back to the last year of work on the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). In today's AWG-LCA plenary, parties went through the agenda and decided what to move into contact groups, developed countries consistently got their way about what was to be discussed, and developing countries got few of their asks for contact groups, one of the larger arguments was whether to have a contact group on 'enhanced action on adaptation'. Developed country parties, led by Norway, argued that this was unnecessary because there were already adaptation negotiations going on (mentioned above) and the new adaptation committee that should be finalised in Doha will take care of the rest. Developing countries were quick to point out that there are all sorts of activities on adaptation that were supposed to be undertaken that have not yet occurred and that the adaptation committee has not yet been set in motion. There are still many significant gaps in adaptation work, particularly adaptation support for developing countries that are not Least Developed Countries, and Bernarditas' joining the NAP negotiations was a signal to developed countries that developing countries are tired of being pushed around on this issue and are ready to play hard ball.

The question for the future will be how well the G77 sticks together, adaptation negotiations are usually characterised by a very solid block of developing countries with the G77, AOSIS, LDCs, and the Africa Group consistently supporting one another's statement and the EU running around trying to figure out their own position, but with Sudan's plea to Bernarditas at the end of the NAP meeting not to hold this important issue for LDCs hostage, it is clear that the G77 will have to work to keep their group strong. Nevertheless, it is important not to blame the Philippines for standing up for all developing countries when the developed countries have done such a pathetic job of financing and implementing adaptation activities. Adaptation and mitigation are supposed to be equal under the convention, but because rich countries haven't figured out a sure-fire way to make money out of adaptation, they have mostly avoided the issue and stalled progress by calling for more and more expert workshops and research papers before anything can be done. It will be interesting to see how this stalemate gets resolved over the next week as parties are eager to have solid outcomes in Doha, it is clear that major compromises will need to be made on both sides.

SBI opening plenary intervention

~Written by YOUNGO and delivered today by Graham Reeder at the opening plenary of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation.
SBI intervention:

Thank you chair.  My name is Graham and I am 21 years old. We would like to take this opportunity to address three pertinent issues on the SBI agenda.

First, with regards to Article 6, we believe that education for sustainable development is crucial to build capacity amongst different stakeholders to harness solutions and build agency at a sub-national level.

If governments are serious about making progress, then young people will need to be educated, aware, and become active participants in climate change decisions.  You need us to be.

We do not need an empty work programme: the new programme on Article 6 must increase access to funding for Article 6 projects- especially non-formal education run by and for youth.

We therefore believe that a permanent programme should be established which must have robust time-bound performance indicators, well-supported national focal points and promote collaboration with stakeholders at all levels. This new programme will be pivotal in ensuring that the implementation of Article 6 can be further enhanced and sustained on a long-term basis.

Second, we welcome the first meeting of the Durban Forum on Capacity Building, and very much look forward to sharing our ideas and experiences of this vital topic.  We hope that this renewed focus will highlight the importance and urgency of robust action on Capacity Building to address barriers to climate action.  An institutionalized forum is a good first step, but more equitable action is needed urgently to actively and continually involve all stakeholders.

Last, a work programme on loss and damage can only be successful if it is operational and implemented. Vulnerable countries are experiencing the impacts of climate change now and cannot afford hesitation on the part of the international community. Research and expertise exist, the SBI’s role must be to consider how to consolidate information and utilize it to implement best practices, and not to repeat research and stall progress.

We have a lot to do.  Let’s approach the coming two weeks with renewed energy and a willingness to cooporate in a spirit of trust.

Thank you

Somali ‘climate refugees’ in Kenya: a consideration and a suggestion

by nathan thanki

There is a Somali proverb that asserts; “Sorrow is like rice in the store; if a basketful is removed every day, it will come to an end at last.” In a case of tragic irony, circumstances in Somalia have conspired to add two baskets of sorrow for every one removed. Regarding rice the proverb has proved only too poignant, especially since the devastating drought of early 2011. The resulting famine has meant that food production will remain below average until at least 2012 (Weir, Blätter, & Gabaudan, 2011). A staggering 13 million people in the Horn of Africa region were affected (Weir, Blätter, & Gabaudan, 2011). The 2011 drought, flood, and famine were the frontline of humanity’s interaction with a warming world and a changing climate.

This post will examine the plight of a specific group—Somalis displaced by these environmental factors—within the larger complex web of displacement in the region. After contextualising in the human cost of this situation and the specific needs of these people, we will overview the academic debate around terminology and policy. Some hints at policy recommendations include: making Somalia governable, establishing guiding principles on environmentally displaced people, ensuring adequate financial support for increased humanitarian efforts, pursuing a more official status, investigating the possibility of return, and promoting sustainable development and environmental awareness through various forms of education. Throughout, the terms “environmentally displaced,” “environmental refugee,” and “climate refugee” are used somewhat interchangeably. Acknowledging the contentiousness around these definitions, no legal or official meaning is implied by this.

A third section begins to outline a project plan that aims to foster environmental and social harmony through education. I contend that any long term strategy to cope with the effects of environmental change on refugee situations will only be successful if accompanied by well-planned education policies and projects.

The front lines of climate change

While issues around climate change and refugees are extremely contentious in academic and policy circles, we must first consider the human face of climate change in Somalia. Forced to leave their land due to years of insufficient rains and changes in the El Nino system, many Somalis (and others in the Horn) gathered up what little possessions they had and set off in search of relief (Dahir & Perry, 2011). Somalia has always been arid, but half a century ago droughts were rare and famine rarer. Now Somalia is the front line of humanities encounter with climate change. It is a cruel irony that when the much needed rains did come, they came with a vengeance. A desertified land cannot cope with the heavy rains, and the result is flooding. Many drought-affected Somalis were forced to flee yet again, becoming internally displaced for a second time, by the floods which brought with them increased risks of malaria, acute water diarrhoea and the contamination of drinking aquifers (OCHA, 2011). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated there were some 4 million food insecure Somalis, 450,000 of them malnourished children, and at least 3.3 million in need of emergency water and sanitation (OCHA, 2011).

To make matters worse, insecurity and general lawlessness in Somalia have hampered local resilience as well as the humanitarian response. The militant group (terrorists in US parlance) al-Shabaab were reportedly forcibly returning displaced people to their lands (OCHA, 2011). US government sanctions impeded the aid response by refusing funding to agencies which interacted with al-Shabaab in order to gain access (Dahir & Perry, 2011). To this political instability, climate change adds its own tensions, as “demand for precious and scarce resources such as water and grazing land is leading to conflict, followed by displacement, more environmental degradation and more conflict” (Needham, 2009, p. 1). Indeed, wars in the region are usually rooted in competition for resources. Climate change serves to intensify that fighting. Food prices will increase with temperature, violent competition will increase and with no other choice but to stay and suffer, people will leave. After all, “unliveable places produce refugees” (Perry, 2010, p. 1)

With the situation rapidly becoming a living hell, thousands of Somalis left once again. Many went to northern Kenya, where the refugee complex Dadaab (3 camps together) awaited. This exodus was horrific, with parents forced to choose which dying child to carry (Dahir & Perry, 2011). And Dadaab was no sanctuary, even after such a journey. Built some 20 years ago, with a capacity of 90,000, it was at the time home to roughly 300,000 (mostly Somali) refugees (Weir, Blätter, & Gabaudan, 2011). In the aftermath of the drought, famine, and flooding, another 152,000 Somali refugees made their way to Dadaab (OCHA, 2011), by now the world’s biggest refugee camp (European Commission, 2011). Conditions in Dadaab have never been far away from desperate, but the surge of refugees fleeing drought in Somalia added even further to the milieu of difficulties that life in Dadaab entails.

Case in point: Dadaab complex

Problems common to many refugee camps are also present in Dadaab: widespread thefts, increased threat of violence and rape, malnutrition, lack of water, lack of education, lack of mobility, and increased threat of disease (Weir, Blätter, & Gabaudan, 2011). Dadaab is close to the border with southern Somalia. This means that the entire area it is in is also vulnerable to the same impacts of climate change as the Horn. The 2011 drought contributed to the malnourishment of 3.8 million Kenyans. Indeed, Dadaab has seen intense flooding before—in 1997, 2003, and 2006—which caused devastation and more movement of people (Needham, 2009). The population of Kenyans in the surrounding area are mostly pastoral and therefore vulnerable to any climate change and environmental degradation (European Commission, 2011). Many (up to 1 million ) have been forced to abandon pastoralism, instead fleeing to wherever there is food aid (Adow, 2008). Inevitably, the presence of a large and growing refugee population creates tensions. This has manifested in competition for firewood, but is prevalent wherever one vulnerable group is afforded aid while another suffers. Despite their long history of assisting their northern neighbours, Kenyans are growing frustrated with the current refugee situation (Herlinger, 2012). Increasingly, host communities and refugees are coming into conflict over trees for firewood and building poles (European Commission, 2011).

The fresh refugees in Dadaab have many of the same problems as those who have been there for twenty years, the familiar trauma, hunger, meaninglessness, and health issues, but with the additional burden of not being legally considered refugees at all. Many are extremely malnourished after their long walk to Kenya. Many have totally lost their ability to feed themselves—with their livestock dead and their crops failed they have nothing to trade or sell. The new refugees have no hope of being whisked away to the safety of some Western country, and nor can they hope for integration into Kenya: the Kenyan government has made it clear this option is off the table (European Commission, 2011). As they add to the gargantuan numbers of Dadaab—which has no significant outflow mechanism—so too do they add to the pressure on that already fragile environment. This singles them out for animosity from the host population and the established refugee population. It also reduces their (and everyone else’s) ability to meet their needs in their new ‘home’. The needs of the new refugees in Dadaab cannot be addressed separately from the old refugees, or even the host population. Whole region strategies have to be considered. That said, they present some specific opportunities for environmental education. As people who have suffered directly from environmental change in their own homes, they have a special need to learn and/or share good environmental management strategies. Whether they return to Somalia or stay in Dadaab—they will need these strategies.

The difficulty of definitions

But how can we deal with a problem that doesn’t officially exist? As was previously mentioned, the concept and term “environmental/climate refugees” is contentious at both the civil society and government levels. Although in use as a term since the 1970s, it was Norman Myer who made it popular (Boano, Zetter, & Morris, 2008). Myers defines them as “people who no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, and other environmental problems, together with the associated problems of population pressures and profound poverty” (Myers, 2002, p. 609). However, predictions about what impacts environmental change will have on migration range from dismissive to sensational, but a mid-range guess is around 200 million by 2050 (Warner, 2011). More worryingly, estimates for the Horn of Africa are not good: approximately 4 million people were displaced by environmental factors in the region in 1995 (Myers, 2002), their numbers adding—as in Dadaab—to the masses of Conventional refugees.

The arguments over definitions and predictions do not appear to be abating.  Briefly, we should survey the landscape of this disaccord in general. Then we can see what policies should be adopted in order to work towards solutions for the environmentally displaced Somalis in Dadaab: how to best cope with their plight in its current context (mixed up in a broader humanitarian disaster), and how to empower them so that should the political conditions be right, they are able to return to their lives and livelihoods.

Much of the tension around the definition lies in the challenge of separating environmental factors from other drivers of migration. This cannot be done easily as environmental degradation is usually a slow onset process that affects people who are directly dependent on natural resources for their livelihood (Dun & Gemenne, 2008). Although they have clearly left because of environmental factors, the new Somalis in Dadaab don’t fit neatly into the Convention. Other factors often weigh in to force “environmental refugees” to leave: landlessness, homelessness, unemployment, rapid urbanization, extensive government corruption or failure, ethnic violence, conventional conflict (as in Somalia), and increased rate of disease (Myers, 2002). But even if environmental degradation is the primary ‘push’ factor, how can we officially determine that it’s not the economic incentive—the ‘pull’ factor—that is the most important factor in determining migration? Further problematizing the policy response to climate change in the context of refugee studies is the lack of a base of empirical evidence (Black, et al., 2008). It is widely agreed that applied research is badly needed into how climate change will influence economic drivers of migration along traditional migration routes (such as Somalis to Kenya (Black, et al., 2008; Warner, 2011; Myers, 2002).

Many argue that giving environmentally displaced people some kind of official home under the refugee umbrella is counter-productive: although the attention to the plight of refugees generally would be welcomed, no actual good would come. Either too wide a definition will result in a net loss of assistance to those in need, or it would play into the hands of governments who wish to classify everyone as an environmental, and therefore economic, migrant to whom they have no responsibility (Dun & Gemenne, 2008) (Stavropolou, 2008). I am of the opinion that as a matter of compassion, environmentally displaced people should be thought of at the very least conceptually as equally vulnerable compared to Conventional refugees. However, given the current situation in Dadaab and the speed at which international policy making progresses, I would rather not put too many eggs in that basket. Besides the very slim possibility of getting resettled to the US or Canada—which in itself is not ideal, nor an easy process—what benefits come with a broader legal definition? We should not rule out an approach that gives (some kind of) legal status, for although one can say it is impossible to determine if climate change is the determining factor, it is certainly as valid as any other (Myers, 2002) and even under the Convention it suffices to prove that one of the conditions (discrimination based on race, religion, political belief etc.) is present, not that it is the primary condition (Dun & Gemenne, 2008). Given that the world has not dealt with the root causes of climate change and environmental destruction, we can unfortunately assume that they will occur at an increasingly rapid rate, even if we don’t know exactly how this will play out regarding displacement. The circular relationship between conflict and environmental degradation—competition over scarce resources causes conflict, which degrades the environment further, which increases tensions—needs to be understood within broader political and social contexts (Myers, 2002).

What’s to be done?

It is perhaps more interesting and instructive to note the similarities this debate has to the one 20 years ago surrounding internally displaced people (IDPs), which eventually yielded Guiding Principles (Stavropolou, 2008). Another such set of principles for the environmentally displaced could work well—bringing attention to the issues, linking policy and research, incorporating affected population feedback, and tying in efforts of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to fund adaptation with countries’ development plans to build local resilience (Black, et al., 2008) (Myers, 2002) (Warner, 2011).

Foreign aid clearly needs to be redirected and augmented, in addition to beefing up of UNHCR’s budget. This is only to cope with meeting the basic needs in the camps effectively and should be seen as an underlying policy. The UNFCCC should also work to ensure pledges to the Green Climate Fund ($100b annually by 2020) should be forthcoming, accessible and directed at adaptation. More collaboration between the UNFCCC and UNHCR will build up knowledge for a proactive rather than reactive approach to environmental migrants (Warner, 2011).

Due to the impracticality and unlikeliness of mass resettlement to developed countries, and the growing inability and unwillingness of the Kenyan state to care for the burgeoning Dadaab complex, research into the potential return of Somalis is needed. To avoid yet more tragedy, the “right questions” (Stone, 2008) need to be asked regarding this possibility. What conditions does their return demand, for example? At a very base level, return will not be possible while Somalia is in such a state of anarchy. But even if it were, migration will occur so long as livelihoods are being undermined by a changing climate. Droughts increase vulnerability to future droughts by killing livestock and eradicating food stocks, unpredictable weather systems undermine livelihoods (Black, et al., 2008). As the already fragile environment of Dadaab is being further degraded by competition for resources, we are more likely to see increases in conflict and environmental damage itself.

The best approach is one of adaptation through education. No amount of orders from above will change harmful environmental behaviours (UNHCR, 2001, p. 55). But what kind of educational policies can shift behaviour to be more sustainable and ultimately improve the lives of all populations—host Kenyans, old Somali refugees, and new climate refugees—while also empowering newcomers with additional resilience that may help if ever they return?

Environmental Education is not the preserve of the West

Any educational project should be informed by the substantial work carried out by the UNHCR and International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), who have published guidebooks on environmental education in the context of refugee camps (UNESCO, 1997) (International Institute for Educational Planning, 2010) (UNHCR, 2001). Criteria of the UNHCR environmental guidelines should also be followed, namely that approaches be cost effective, include participation of all local stakeholders, integrate with other environmental management and humanitarian efforts, and be preventative rather than reactive in an ad-hoc manner (UNHCR, 1998, p. 11).

In Dadaab, there are 15 primary schools serving 17,000 children in the refugee population, and one local secondary school that some refugee children attend (UNESCO, 1997). Clearly the educational situation as a whole is not adequate. As various inhabitants of Dadaab have testified, An environmental education project would refocus attention on education in general and would allow for broader improvements—building more classrooms, regenerating old ones. To begin with an outreach campaign would be needed to encourage children to come and their parents to let them. Methods to facilitate this would be to link up with food programmes at the camp to give hot meals at the school for children. Another would be to give roles to women in the classroom, alleviating some concerns about security of children and involving more of the adult community in the education process. To ensure a broad reach, both of the initial advertisement and then later of the environmental messaging, requires the use of formal, non-formal and informal channels that incorporate different media and languages (UNHCR, 1998) (ProAct Network, 2010) (International Institute for Educational Planning, 2010).

Ideally a baseline study would be carried out to establish both educational needs and environmental attitudes and behaviours. This should be done mindful of the dynamics between the three main divisions of people: hosts, previous refugees, and new climate refugees. These initial assessments would also bring together most of the NGO and UN actors to assess how environmental education can be brought into the camp as part of broader environmental management strategies, and in a way that reinforces any environmental themes in other programmes. Any discussions crafting the details of the project should involve in a central way not only representatives of the refugee population (teachers, students, parents) but also civil society (NGO workers in other projects, UN staff,) government (Kenyans education and development officials) and importantly, the host population (teachers, leaders). To avoid future conflict over environmental problems, the host population must be involved in the process. No doubt they, as the established population, will have valuable know how that can be incorporated into the educational project. They will also be able to outline to project designers what the local laws and traditions are regarding the environment.

Obviously a project of this ambition requires a lot of planning, money, training, and coordination. There is no formula for sustainable development. For every problem anticipated, there will be five more that come up. And Dadaab is an extremely challenging, volatile, and complex setting. Beyond camp security (shaky at best), the risks are great: environmental education is paramount to environmental sustainability, and that sustainability is paramount to survival. But a self-reflective, continuous, multi-sectoral approach, based on local knowledge and supported by public information and mutually agreed short term regulation that clearly sets out the rules could yield tangible results in terms of environmental, and therefore lifestyle, improvement (International Institute for Educational Planning, 2010) (UNHCR, 1998). Luckily, UNESCO has already run a (poorly documented) pilot project in environmental and peace education in Dadaab. A future project can build on their efforts, benefit from the resources they developed (teacher training, pupil workbooks, lesson plans etc) and learn from their lessons. Refugees should be involved early on in planning, formal and non-formal channels should be harmonised, teacher training should be participatory, activities should be linked to other projects, and the largest costs will be occurred in start-up (UNESCO, 1997).  

Perhaps the most obvious and most reactive potential criticism to such a project is that it is culturally condescending—a western guilt over environmental damage hoisted on some of the poorest and most vulnerable people on earth. While it is always good to be on the lookout for greenwash, it must also be understood that sustainable development is not about green consumerism or imperialism, it is about ensuring that present needs are met without sacrificing future generations’ abilities to meet the same needs. The effort to bring a sustainable development paradigm to people who need it urgently is not a cheap, quick, or easy task. Efforts to do so need commitment across the board, and they need proper measures of accountability, transparency, gender/cultural sensitivity and supporting research. If those conditions are met, Somalis in Dadaab could just maybe start removing some of those baskets of sorrow.

 

References and Resources

*To learn more about conditions in Dadaab from the perspectives of Somalis who are either currently living there or have now left, see the excellent “Somalis in Maine,” referenced below.

Adow, M. (2008, October). Pastoralists in Kenya. Forced Migration Review(31), p. 34.

Black, R., Kniveton, D., Skeldon, R., Coppard, D., Murata, A., & Schmidt-Verkerk, K. (2008). Demographics and Climate Change: Future Trends And their Policy Implications for Migration. Brighton: University of Sussex.

Boano, D., Zetter, P., & Morris, D. (2008). Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration. Oxford: University of Oxford.

Dahir, M., & Perry, A. (2011, September 5). A Famine We Made? Time, pp. 38-41.

Dun, O., & Gemenne, F. (2008, October). Defining ‘environmental migration’. Forced Migration Review(31), pp. 10-11.

European Commission. (2011). “Climate Refugees” – Legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration. Brussels: European Parliment. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/dec/ep-climate-change-refugees-study.pdf

Herlinger, C. (2012, January 19). “Food becomes Everything”. National Catholic Reporter, 48(6), 20-21.

Huiseman, K. A., Hough, M., Langellier, K. M., & Nordstrom Toner, C. (2011). Somalis in Maine: Crossing Cultural Currents. Berkely: North Atlantic Books.

International Institute for Educational Planning. (2010). Chapter 4.4 Environmental Education. In International Institute for Educational Planning, Guidebook for planning education in emergencies and reconstruction (pp. 85 – 101). Paris: International Institute for Educational Planning. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001902/190223e.pdf

Myers, N. (2002). Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century. Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences, 357(1420), 609-613. Retrieved February 27, 2012, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3066769

Needham, A. (2009, December 18). Nowhere to hide from climate change in Kenyan refugee camp. Retrieved from UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/4b2b76a79.html

OCHA. (2011, October 25). Somalia Famine and Drought Situation Report 19. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from Internal Displacement: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/%28httpDocuments%29/DC59083766027A7DC1257938007897E5/$file/OCHA+Somalia+Situation+Report+No.+19-25+October+2011.pdf

Perry, A. (2010, December 13). Land of Hope. Time, pp. 68-73.

ProAct Network. (2010, October). Environmental Management in Camp Settings. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from ProAct Network: http://proactnetwork.org/proactwebsite/media/download/Factsheets/ProActFactsheet_EnvironmentalManagementInCampSettings.pdf

Stal, M. (2011). Flooding and Relocation: The Zambezi River Valley in Mozambique. International Migration, 49, 125-143.

Stavropolou, M. (2008, October). Drowned in definitions? Forced Migration Review(31), pp. 11-12.

Stone, D. (2008, October). Asking the right questions. Forced Migration Review(31), pp. 42 – 43.

UNESCO. (1997). Refugee Education in Kenya: Education for a Peaceful and Sustainable Future. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from UNESCO: http://www.unesco.org/education/educprog/emergency/casestudy/kenya.htm

UNHCR. (1998). Refugee Operations and Environmental Management: Key Principles for Decision Makers. Geneva: UNHCR. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from http://www.unhcr.org/3b03b24d4.html

UNHCR. (2001). Refugee Operation and Environmental Management: A Handbook of Selected Lessons Learned from the Field. Geneva: UNHCR. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from http://www.unhcr.org/406c38bd4.html

Warner, K. (2011, May). Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations. Retrieved from UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/4df9cc309.pdf

Weir, E. A., Blätter, A., & Gabaudan, M. (2011, December 12). Horn of Africa: Not The Time To Look Away. Retrieved from Refugees International: http://www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/horn-africa-not-time-look-away

 

What happened to the hope of a green climate fund?

by Nathan Thanki

In our pre-COP speculations, everyone thought that the GCF would be one of the key issues and (possibly) outcomes of Durban. The promise–of a new, large, additional, transparent fund that would be driven by the countries that received the money and guaranteed adaptation funding–was great, a light at the end of the dark tunnel through which parts of the regime, like the continuation of Kyoto, might not make it. When the TC report came up on the COP plenary agenda, ears all over the ICC picked up. And yet since then there has been a resounding silence. So what’s been happening?

Many countries expressed dissatisfaction with elements of the TC report on the design of the GCF. Developing countries had many concerns–that this would become just another climate fund–and developed countries were concerned that the fund might actually be too recipient-driven and COP controlled. However, most countries thought it was better to have a compromised design than no fund at all. AOSIS practically begged Parties in the COP plenary to leave the text. Previously the US and Saudi Arabia had blocked consensus of the report as it was forwarded to the COP. But in the plenary, new voices of dissent emerge. ALBA–through Venezuela–began insisting they could not accept the text as it stood. Then COP president Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, reading from a script, declared the obvious: Parties have diverging views on the fund. She proposed that those with the biggest concerns get together and talk it over in an informal over which she would personally oversee. And just like that, the GCF disappeared from our radar.

Where it’s at now is somewhat unclear. Even after the US and ALBA looked certain to open the text, it appears that the COP presidency has kept it closed. Instead, Parties have been working in a very closed group, termed “Indabas”; a gathering,  or council of elders. We are essentially playing a waiting game to see what they come up with by the end of the week. The biggest concern right now is that some new text emerges out of the air that doesn’t reflect all Parties concerns. That’s some step down from the promise that the GCF was going into last week.

There are rumours around the halls of the ICC now that a deal has been struck. Saudi Arabia, the US, ALBA and Egypt have all been reportedly blocking progress by sticking to their positions. It seems now that something has given: but it is more likely that the sacrifices were in terms of an overall package. In other words, we will have a more or less structurally sound (apart from the concerns over a private sector facility) but empty Fund. In exchange for that, what did developing countries give up? We’ll know by tomorrow night for sure, but it can’t be good.