All posts tagged adaptation

Posted:
December 6, 2011
Author:
COA Students

What’s health got to do with it?

by Graham Reeder

So how are climate change and health connected anyway? I don’t know about you, but the first thing that comes to mind when I used to think about climate change is arctic sea ice and major industry polluting. As I’ve developed a stronger interest in public health issues over the last couple of years, the human ecologist in me has driven me to make connections between climate change, social justice, and health. And guess what…I’m not alone. The wonderful thing about COPs is that if you’re passionate about an issue that relates to climate change in any way, you’ll probably find a group of people here who engage in it as well.

This year’s COP has actually been a big one for climate and health; Sunday saw a whole side conference on health and climate change and there have been many side-events and meetings about making that link. Unfortunately, my work following the adaptation negotiations has meant that I haven’t been able to go to most of those things, but I’ve had a number of great conversations with some of the people working on the issues.

Climate change has major impacts on health issues which vary from region to region. One helpful way to categorise our thinking about this is to think about extreme weather events and slow-onset events. Extreme weather events are things like hurricanes, floods, heat waves and drought, all of which are linked to climate change (See IPCC fourth assessment report working group II). What most of these events do is exacerbate existing health problems; when disaster strikes, it is consistently the least resilient who suffer most. This is because they have less access to preventative health care, emergency services, can be already suffering from some other under treated health issue, or are literally living in more dangerous locations (low-lying areas, along eroding coastlines, in urban hot-spots, etc…) All of these conditions make extreme weather events a serious concern for health. This is not to say that only the poorer countries of the world are affected, I don’t think I have to remind anyone that the heat-waves in Europe and Hurricane Katrina were a perfectly good reminder that inequality in resilience and access to services is ever-present in even the richest nations.

In terms of slow-onset events, media and international attention has a tougher time picking up the story. One might call it easy to gain wide readership of a front-page story about floods in Bangladesh that have killed thousands and cost up to 20 million USD over the last two years, but in a world where attention span is adjusted to twitter and everything is urgent, it can be much more difficult to expose the impacts of changing vectors on malaria patterns in sub-Saharan Africa or glacial melting causing water-access issues in Latin America, and of course the looming sea level rise issue that has low-level urban areas quivering in their boots. These long-term impacts will have catastrophic impacts on health unless serious work is undertaken pre-emptively to build resilience and strengthen communities’ ability to cope. I say cope because given what I’ve seen from the UN on adaptation policy progress, coping is the best we can hope for.  Some other climate related slow-onset events that are going to have major health impacts are ocean acidification, desertification, changes in salt-water/freshwater distribution, loss of traditional medicinal species, a major decrease in agricultural productivity, forest degradation, erosion due to changing rainfall, and mass migration due to environments becoming uninhabitable. I’ll touch on the migration piece in a future blog post, but all of these impacts have colossal health ramifications that most of the world’s infrastructures are completely unprepared to deal with. We have wasted so much time fighting about whether or not climate change is real and who should do something about it that it is coming around to knock us over from behind.

In short, the connection between climate change and health is a crucial one. Given the current ambition levels on the table and the likelihood of anything changing soon, it looks like we’re in for a whole lot of warming, and a proactive health/resilience centered approach is the only chance of dealing with this kind of catastrophe.

On a policy note, the most recent AWG-LCA (Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action) text has an addendum with, among other things, sections on building resilience; poverty and inequality; protecting and promoting human health; gender; territory, mobility, and urban development; and migrants. Most of the text in these sections involves looking into things and further investigating them rather than acting on the knowledge that is already there, but seeing this language in a text like this is a little bit refreshing. There is supposedly a new text coming out tonight or tomorrow, only time will tell if any of those sections remain.

Posted:
December 5, 2011
Author:
COA Students

A New Adaptation Framework: Don’t hold your breath for this empty shell

by Graham Reeder

This past week (and year), I’ve been following the issue of adaptation. As many of you know, Climate Change is not just a long-term threat that is looming in the horizon; it is being experienced by people now in a very real way.  The World Health Organisation estimates that climatic changes are causing 150,000 deaths annually; the vast majority of which are in sub-Saharan Africa.

One of the major, but unpublicised outcomes of Cancun was the groundwork for a new adaptation framework. The Bali Action Plan from 2007 laid out a track for mitigation and adaptation to be considered equally, but this has obviously not been the case. Laying out the Cancun Adaptation Framework is basically the first real step in doing anything sincere about adaptation under the convention. Having said this, the first step has truly been a baby step.

Negotiators have been working out how to incorporate the existing elements of adaptation under the convention, namely the Nairobi Work Programme that sets out to research how adaptation to climate change works and where the vulnerability lies, to fit into the new framework. It looks like the overarching body to oversee adaptation is to be the Adaptation Committee, a group of negotiators who will be responsible for creating coherence among adaptation activities and holding workshops. The composition of that committee is still being worked out; parties disagree about whether emphasis should be on the countries who will be doing the adaptation (developing), or the countries who will be financing that adaptation (developed, but not really). Under the Committee, there will be three branches, the first will be the Nairobi Work Programme, viewed as the scientific and technical arm of adaptation that will mostly do research, the second will be a work programme on Loss and Damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, and the third will be the formation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). All of this will be nicely tied together by the Adaptation Fund, which will work with the Green Climate Fund and other partners to finance all of this bustling activity. But wait; don’t get too excited about all of this action yet, remember that the GCF isn’t operationalized, and probably won’t be for a while, and even if the Adaptation Fund gets operationalized, it remains nearly empty. Rich countries aren’t happy that they don’t have more say over where and how the money in the Adaptation Fund gets spent, so they stubbornly don’t fill it despite their obligation to do so.

But enough about finance, there will be plenty more on that from my colleagues who follow it more closely. There have been some very interesting arguments between parties about the 3 elements of the adaptation framework, work is still being done in back rooms about the adaptation committee, but the chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (Robert-Owen Jones from Australia) is adamant that negotiations should be as transparent as possible and has kept his meetings on adaptation open to observers.

The group of negotiators who work on adaptation (the adaptation community, as they call themselves) are pretty much the same on all issues. A handful of strong negotiators from the US, Australia, the EU, Norway, Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, the Cook Islands, and Timor Leste dominate most of the talking space. COA’s very own Juan Pablo Hoffmaister (07), one of the founders of Earth In Brackets, is the lead negotiator for the G77+China (a group of 131 developing countries) on issues of adaptation and works tirelessly to coordinate the group and keep it strong. The adaptation community is forwarding several decisions to the COP on the three components of the framework. They have developed a more solid plan for the work programme on loss and damage, after negotiating serious compromise between AOSIS (the Alliance of Small Island States) and the US/Australia on the issue of creating a mechanism to actually do something about it. The US doesn’t think they’re ready to commit to doing anything about loss and damage, saying that they need another year to learn about what it really means and how to deal with it before deciding on anything, while AOSIS is saying that they don’t need another year of sitting around a conference table twiddling their thumbs, they are suffering in terms of millions of dollars and many lives and need the issue to start being addressed as soon as possible. They have ultimately reached a compromise in which the possibility of a mechanism is mentioned, but there is no commitment to actually creating one.

On National Adaptation Plans, the fight has been a little bit more nuanced. Initial division was between developed and developing countries over involvement of the Global Environment Facility as an interim financer until the Green Climate Fund is created, developed countries wanted the GEF to have nothing to do with NAPs because the last round of adaptation programmes (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) that were focused on urgent and immediate adaptation needs were supposed to be implemented by the GEF and still haven’t been 3 years later. Developing countries also wanted to be clear that NAPs couldn’t just be a planning process, but needed to have an implementation component. The Least Developed Countries are sick of seeing money go towards plans that don’t get follow-through. The latest fight is within the G77 itself though, Least Developed Countries (a group of mostly African countries that also includes parties like Bangladesh and Afghanistan) and “particularly vulnerable countries,” a broader group that also includes some Latin American countries are disagreeing about including mentions of particularly vulnerable countries in the text. The LDC group have always been privileged in adaptation text because their capacity to deal with adaptation themselves is the lowest, but that doesn’t mean that they’re the only ones who are vulnerable. This is where finance becomes important, this fight wouldn’t be happening if there was enough money in the pot to go around, but countries are scrambling over the scraps that rich countries have made available. Because of this, the G77 isn’t united on NAPs, making it a lot harder for them to negotiate strongly on the issue. This is most assuredly part of an EU and US (particularly the UK) tactic to divide and conquer the G77.

On the Nairobi Work Programme, most of the fight has been figuring out how to bring it under the Cancun Adaptation Framework. Because it is the only piece of this puzzle that predates the framework, parties are squabbling over how it should fit into the picture. While most developing country parties want to see them report to the Adaptation Committee and start a new phase that is focused on more applicable adaptation needs, developed country parties are happy with the way things have been going and like that it has mostly produced a bunch of academia on adaptation that can’t be applied in very many contexts. After some tough negotiations, negotiators have agreed to start a new phase (the Durban Phase) of the work programme that will have a few of the elements that developing countries wanted, but still won’t be focused on implementation.

Overall I’ve gotten the impression that adaptation negotiations have been going well, they’ve made progress on issues and have (for the most part) worked in the spirit of compromise. That being said, there is absolutely no way that the work that is being produced by the adaptation community reflects the urgency and needs of climate change adaptation on the ground. In my SBI intervention yesterday I tried to stress that youth and other particularly vulnerable groups really don’t have time to sit around and wait for them to squabble over the placement of commas and that what practitioners already know about adaptation needs to be both implemented and funded.

Posted:
November 30, 2011
Author:
COA Students

The Tragedy of the Least Developed Countries

by Graham Reeder and Nathan Thanki

While there are more controversial and contentious issues regarding financing for adaptation (the report on the GCF today in COP plenary, or the report from the Adaptation Fund Board to CMP plenary), there are some interesting discussions going on elsewhere.

For example, in yesterday’s continued opening plenary of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, Uganda stirred things up with a vivacious and biting criticism of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)(read World Bank) and it’s role in funding adaptation to climate change. They started by pointing out how the failure of current National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) is entirely due to the slow and inadequate financing of the GEF. When Uganda developed their NAPA plan in 2007 to deal with urgent adaptation needs, they were expecting the project to be funded and implemented as was mandated by the UNFCCC. A year later they got their project back saying that they needed to change their implementing agency because their chosen partner (UNEP) was incapable of handling a project of that size. Who the GEF would have preferred instead is unclear. Unfortunately for the GEF, Uganda does it’s homework, and decided to conduct some follow up research. Speaking with permission of Gambia on behalf of the LDC group, Uganda pointed out that UNEP has implemented even larger programmes than theirs, and therefore has both the relevant capacity and experience. Uganda maintained in no uncertain terms that the GEF had no right to dictate such terms. The NAPAs are supposed to be country driven, and are not another excuse for the World Bank to get their fingers into the development plans of the Least Developed Countries. Following up today, the LDC group went on to complain that the GEF, through its Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF), has only funded NAPAs even though there are many other activities that need urgent attention under the LDC work programme.

As countries move into the next phase of adaptation to climate change, parties like Uganda and Bangladesh want to make sure that things actually get moving; they are sick of being asked to put their own resources into developing plans that don’t get funded or implemented. Uganda gracefully pointed out that the principal of urgent and immediate needs which the NAPAs are meant to address aren’t so relevant when they finally get implemented 80 years down the road. Urgent needs are urgent needs after all. But the lack of urgency in helping LDCs respond to climate change is, in their own words, “disappointing and depressing.” The question of the Ugandan delegate highlights: what is the point of having a fund (LDCF) if access to that fund was difficult bordering on impossible? In a break away contact group on finance under SBI, Colombia made similar points about a lack of understanding that climate change is happening right now, and its impacts are being felt RIGHT NOW. She added that of all the projects the LDCF had assisted with transfer of technologies, only 2 had been for adaptation.

On top of the dire state of adaptation funding there are the severe problems that the developing world has with the GEF as the financial mechanism. There are problems with transparency around how much money is in the funds, where it is from, where it goes, who asked for it and so on. There are even more problems with transparency around the decision making process. And while the SBI and COP can make recommendations to the GEF, it is not enough. There are too many problems, too many bad experiences, and too much bad blood. It is clear why a new fund (the GCF) with a guaranteed 50% window for adaptation and answerable to the COP is so desireable.

The Ugandan intervention was definitely one of the more lively and honest that we’ve seen in this COP, but as the rich of the world continuously refuse to commit to emissions reductions while at the same time stall and backtrack on promises of adequate, additional, scaled-up and predictable funding, we can expect more of the same. It’s the same old refrain: time is running out. For some it already has.

Posted:
November 26, 2011
Author:
COA Students

“Money doesn’t talk, it swears”

On the promise of the Green Climate Fund

by Nathan Thanki

Under the UNFCCC, expectations that the international community has regarding climate finance are clear. Article 4, paragraph 3 states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations,” and that there is a need for “adequacy and predictability” in the flow of these funds. Paragraph 4 elaborates that these commitments include helping developing countries “that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation needs.” Paragraph 7 says that the extent to which developing countries address climate change “will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments related to financial resources,” while paragraph 8 declares that the funds should be for meeting “the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures.”

That all seems fairly straightforward then: rich countries should give poor countries (in addition to existing aid) money specifically for both adapting to and mitigating climate change. However, as is always the case where money is involved, it is not so simple. Developed countries say, as they wash their hands of the responsibility of destroying the planet, that they are pouring money into climate financing. Developing countries say that they are seeing none of it, that they are funding many response efforts from their own budgets, that no money is given for badly needed adaptation projects, that most money goes to middle income countries like Brazil not the poorest countries like Zambia, and that the way climate financing is done is inappropriate as it gives too much power to the donor and not the recipient. There will be a few discussions around finance at Durban: reports on the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) and Adaptation Fund (AF) as well as from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). But perhaps the most highly controversial discussions will be around the new plan for long-term climate finance, the Green Climate Fund (GCF). So it is worth our time to know a little bit of the nitty-gritty.

 

Origins

The GCF was originally floated as an idea in Copenhagen, but was far overshadowed by the fiasco that was COP15. The figures of 30billion USD annually from 2010-2012 and 100billion USD annually by 2020 were conjured up, seemingly with no basis. As part of the Cancun agreements (1/CP.16 Para 4), it was decided that a Transitional Committee (TC) would meet throughout 2011 and come back to the COP in Durban with a design for the GCF. The TC was given some rough guidelines as to what the Fund structure should look like. The GCF should: be accountable to the COP; have a board of 12 developing country and 12 developed country members; have a trustee (The World Bank will serve as interim for 3 years) which holds the assets separately despite comingling, and which answers to the Board; have a separate secretariat; have 2 windows for mitigation and adaptation. Certain criteria were then laid out for how the TC itself should be structured: 15 developed and 25 developing countries, with consideration for gender balance; supported by various UN agencies, multilateral banks, international financial institutions and the UNFCCC secretariat; open for observers from civil society and the private sector.

 

The Design Process

The TC met this March in Mexico, and immediately formed 4 work-streams: scope, principles, cross cutting issues; governance; operational modalities; monitoring and evaluating. They also established a Technical Support Unit (TSU)—basically a group of finance and UN experts—to help the TC. By the second meeting in Tokyo, there were clear problems. Of the 5 chairs and co-chairs, developed countries had a 3/5 majority. Developing countries also complained of a lack of funding to assist them in attending TC meetings, and a conflict of interest in having the World Bank as trustee and in the TSU. Parties failed to make progress and by the fourth meeting in Cape Town this October, pretty much everything was still up for discussion. In governance, developed countries (led by the US) argued that the relationship of the COP to the GCF was advisory rather than supervisory, which developing countries strongly rejected. In the COP, developing countries are far more numerous, and so they want to make sure that decisions regarding their climate financing can be overseen by the whole world. In terms of structure, many developed countries (and developing countries with forests) want a separate funding window for REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation) and for the private sector, while G77 nations want windows for technology and capacity building instead. The role of the private sector is itself highly contested. Developed countries talk of a need to leverage private finance (by basically guaranteeing to bail out investors if they make reckless investments), but developing countries (mostly) maintain that funds should be public, and in the form of grants (NOT loans) that use direct access. Regarding the environmental safeguards which would ensure that funds go to projects that do not do more harm than good to people or planet, the US and Brazil oppose setting any, while developing countries like India want standards to apply to the private sector too. Many developing countries oppose calls (most loudly coming from the UK) that funds should be given in exchange for ‘verified results’, pointing out the obvious fact that a successful project cannot be implemented without funds.

 

Outcome

At the end of all that bickering, what was the outcome? A non-consensus paper <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/06.pdf>. The US and Saudi Arabia blocked consensus, meaning that the TC report to the COP will likely be re-opened for negotiating in Durban. The small gains made by developing countries may be held to ransom as part of a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ Durban package. Developed countries will probably push hard to ensure that developing countries should also donate to the fund, just as they are pushing hard for developing countries to sign on to a legally binding treaty for reducing emissions. Both amount to a blatant disregard of the Convention principles of polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibilities.

 

Our Demands

So if that is what to expect, then what should we demand? Throughout the TC meetings, civil society has been loudly and clearly calling for the following: at least 50% of funds should be for closing the adaptation gap; the Board should have non-voting members from civil society and affected communities; the GCF should be cautious when engaging the private sector so as not to risk public finance; funds must be available through direct access, grants should be used over loans, and in cases where loans are used they should not add to unsustainable debt; there should be no ‘gap’ in finance between 2012 and 2020; funds should be used for ambitious projects (for example, a mitigation project that reduces the most emissions); the GCF should have explicit legal personality, so that it does not rely on the World Bank; the amount of 100b USD is at best a conservative ballpark figure—many other studies have suggested that the amounts needed for developing countries to adequately adapt to and mitigate climate change are several times higher. The list of demands is long and includes reiterations of even basic principles such as transparency and strong safeguards, which really is depressing: it shows how much is still at risk.

 

Money matters

Ironically, as we go in to Durban the GCF looks the most likely issue to have an agreed outcome. If developed countries are to really do nothing to tackle climate chance, and instead renege on their Kyoto commitments, then they need a diversion. A large pot of money (or rather, the promise of such a pot—so far there is only $12b) would provide a good one. The promise of money, especially when that money is needed for developing countries’ survival, is a great negotiating tool for developed countries. I think of it more as a coercion tool. The US is holding out on the GCF so it can use it as part of a package later. For this reason, expect the issue of climate finance to be everywhere present at Durban.

 

 

 

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