Agriculture, Aviation, and Article 4.1.(c): a report-back from Sector Specific Approaches

by Trudi Zundel

Yesterday Parties met for the first time to talk about cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions under the Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action. Sectoral approaches are simply work programmes that are specific to different sectors, like agriculture, aviation, or waste managment, for example.

These sector-specific actions are supposed to “enhance the implementation of Article 4. 1(c) of the Convention,” which details the commitments of countries that are members of the UNFCCC. It basically says, in so many words, that countries need to develop and implement practices that “control, reduce, or prevent” greenhouse gas emissions from their sectors.

This is an important area of the negotiations (if you could find an area that wasn’t important). Here, countries are supposed to design programmes to deal with reducing emissions across the whole economy, although to date the only programmes being developed are under agriculture and bunker fuels. For context, this is where the negotiations on whether or not there will be a work programme on agriculture under mitigation.

For years countries have been trying to put together a framework for work programmes, but negotiations have only resulted in an ever-growing document that lays out the different versions that countries would like to see, in separate “options.” Now they are trying to combine those options into one text that can be negotiated, and the key disagreements are coming to a head.

There are three main parts to the framework currently: the general framework, which explains the principles and values that the specific programmes should comply by; an agricultural work programme, which is one of the main Durban priorities for South Africa and the African Union; and a work programme on bunker fuels, which would reduce emissions from air and marine transport–something that would seriously affect trade.

What does it matter what the framework looks like? Several developed countries are questioning the need for any general framework at all–the US, Australia, and New Zealand think that, since each sector is unique, no framework could be relevant to all of them and that it’s better to leave out a framework and only  include considerations that are relevant in each specific sector’s programme. However, the principles expressed in the general framework are important because they will determine how much developing countries have to do. The UNFCCC convention contains the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which essentially means that developed countries have more commitments than developing countries because they have more resources and of historical responsibility (which are  two of the reasons why only developed countries are legally bound to reduce their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol). Developing countries are determined to have that aspect of the Convention expressed in the general framework, otherwise they may be bound to commitments they cannot uphold… leaving out the general framework seems like a ploy to sneak around the parts of the Convention that they don’t like, though: if developed countries aren’t willing to explicitly state common but differentiated responsibilities in the general framework, it’s unlikely that they’ll be excited to state it in specific sectoral programmes.

Developing countries want to have more than just common but differentiated responsibilities included– some of the options include paragraphs on ensuring that programmes don’t affect food security, contribute to reducing poverty, and don’t negatively affect trade.

A lot of countries said that they were committed to having an agricultural work programme come out of Durban. However, Argentina was also very clear that there would be no agricultural work programme without a general framework; developing countries in general, including Brazil, India, and China, are holding fast that there needs to be a general framework before agreeing to details on sectoral programmes.

What does all of this mean, going into the second week? A new draft of the LCA text, which still isn’t a draft negotiating document, came out this morning.

1. The new LCA text includes common but differentiated responsibilities in the general framework… The text hasn’t been negotiated yet, though, so who knows what will happen.

2. It’s likely that the LCA will request the Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice to develop a work programme on agriculture as part of the Durban outcome–both developing and developed countries have said that that is one of their goals, and the request is included in the newest LCA note.  NGOs are fighting hard against this, as the work programme on agriculture is under an Article that deals with mitigation, will almost certainly result in soil carbon markets. The World Bank is throwing its entire weight behind developing it, and is chomping at the bit for the go-ahead from the UNFCCC that would legitimize it.

3. There might be some language about bunker fuels, but the text is still convoluted with different options. For that we’ll have to wait and see.

4. Either way, for better or for worse, it looks like sectoral approaches, which have been under consideration for so many years, will be reflected in the final Durban outcome.

 

Russia Presented a Possible Deal Braker

by Samuli Sinisalo

On wednesday, the COP plenary discussed Russias proposal to amend the UN Framework Convention on Climate change.

In the convention countries are divided into different cathegories – and have different responsibilities – according to their development status. These annexes are Annex 1, which includes all the developed countries. have legally binding emission reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol.

There is also another annex, called the Annex 2. That is a group of countries who, in addition to the responsibilities laid out for all Annex 1 countries, have the responsibility to provide financial assisstance to the developing countries, or non-Annex 1 countries. In practice Annex 2 includes all the A1 countries, except the Eastern European economies in transition.

The developing countries are known non-Annex 1 countries. They have no legally binding emission reduction commitments under the Convention, or the the Kyoto Protocol. Their primary concern is development and poverty eradication – not cutting emissions.

The problem is that this division was created twenty years ago, in 1991. Since then a lot has happened – many countries that were underdeveloped two decades ago are now seen as the global economic engines, notably the BASIC countries, Brazil, South-Africa, India and China.

Especially the United States has had problems to accept emission reduction targets, while the BASICs have no obligations to reduce their emissions as they are non-Annex 1 countries.

On wednesday afternoon the the COP plenary discussed Russias proposal to add a mechanism to the convention that would enable this division from 1991 to be reviewed by the COP periodically. This idea received wide support from the COP, only Saudi-Arabia spoke against it saying that the historic responsibility that the developed countries have on climate change has not changed since 1991.

The President of COP 17 will take this proposal forward and take it to consultations. If designed carefully, this could help open the deadlock that climate negotiations have been in for several years.

Climate-Stupid Agriculture @ the UNFCCC

by Trudi Zundel
With food security threatened throughout the developing world, the global community has been paying a lot more attention to the effect of climate change on agriculture. More volatile weather patterns makes planning crop rotations difficult; higher concentration of rain patterns, whether dry or wet spells, means that fields either dry out or wash away–and farmers have little indication of which pattern will come when. The 2°C warming that Parties agreed to in Cancun is predicted by the IPCC to result in a 4-5 degree warming across Africa, which would pose an unimaginable threat to agriculture in the region. Needless to say small-shareholder farmers, who constitute the majority of farmers worldwide, are in desperate need of resources to help them adapt to their new conditions.

One way of the best ways of adapting is to increase the resilience of the farming ecosystem–agroecology (or sustainable agriculture in general, but that definition can be interpreted in many ways) is a way of farming that is modelled after a natural ecosystem: incorporating biodiversity, compost, mulches, perhaps a bit of agroforestry.
One thing that’s important to know about soils is that they can take carbon out of the air. I’m not a soil scientist, but I trust that this is true. The “richer” or “healthier” a soil is, the more carbon it can fix, or sequester. Sustainable agricultural practices improve the soil sequestration rate—how much carbon soils are able to take out of the air. In an ideal world, this wouldn’t be a problem: farmers would have more resilient land, and more carbon would happen to be removed from the atmosphere. However, here in the sad reality of the UNFCCC, where profits take priority over people and the market reigns supreme, soil sequestration could be the death of a meaningful adaptation programme for agriculture. Policy-makers who are looking for new ways to mitigate climate change have latched onto this fact, and want to use soil carbon sequestration to create a new carbon offset market.
The World Bank has been subversively spearheading the idea of climate-smart agriculture— sustainable agriculture that is a triple-win: farmers increase food security, adapt to climate change, and carbon is mitigated. The Bank also happens to be one of the organizations most likely to profit from soil carbon markets. It is not interested in an agricultural work programme that would benefit the poor, but instead in the profits it thinks it can make from a market (after all, it is a bank first).
Many policy-makers are saying that climate-smart agriculture is the ideal intersection of adaptation and mitigation. The problem is that mitigation for offsets must be quantified. That means measuring, reporting, and verifying the amount of carbon stored in the soil–which leads to technocratic experts coming onto small-shareholders’ farms to tell them what practices will maximize soil sequestration. While land may end up being more resilient under these projects, it will most likely just be a co-benefit—despite claims from the World Bank and FAO of the opposite. farmers’ sovereignty over their own land will naturally be compromised if they don’t have complete control over their own practices. What’s worse, they’ll be dictated practices that maximize mitigation; there’s no money to be made off of adaptation for adaptation’s sake.

Where’s agriculture in the text?

We’re at a dangerous point now: for a few years Parties have been trying to push an agricultural work programme under Article 1. b. iv of the Bali Action Plan, which is “sectoral approaches to enhance mitigation.” If agriculture is under mitigation, there really is nothing guaranteeing funding for agricultural adaptation. There has been some talk in Durban about an agricultural work programme somewhere in adaptation… this is also not to be trusted. Given the rampant expansionism of carbon markets under REDD+, any inclusion of agriculture could be twisted to legitimize soil carbon markets.
Food and agricultural organizations are very excited about climate-smart agriculture; it actually seems to be becoming a buzz-word, appearing in several publications from different organizations. The side events about climate-smart appear to be focussed on justifying the need for sustainable agriculture in the first place: statistics, charts, and graphs about how innovation increases food security. I always forget that the world is far behind—the inherent value of sustainable agriculture isn’t assumed. Organizations in support of climate-smart agriculture are too focused on justifying the benefits of sustainable agriculture, and don’t understand the subtler threats of its place under mitigation (or don’t care).

It seems likely that agriculture will make it into the text somewhere in a Durban outcome, especially if a text is presented at the end like in Cancun. Zuma has publicly said that he wants a work programme for agriculture; the World Bank has been attended African agricultural ministerials all year to try and get them on board. In general, civil society seems wary of the work programme and its not-so-subtle connection to carbon markets.

 

Like I said in my last blog, developing countries have to be really, really wary of false solutions here in Durban. Countries are feeling pressure for a successful outcome, but aren’t willing to make any concessions—instead, they’re using their resources and creativity to assemble solutions that make them look good. An agricultural work programme looks good, especially given that this is an African COP, but it is a wolf very cleverly disguised in sheep’s clothing.